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THE “FIXATION THESIS” AND OTHER FALSEHOODS
Frederick Mark Gedicks*
Abstract
This Article challenges the so-called “fixation thesis” of publicmeaning originalism. This thesis holds that the meaning of the
Constitution was fixed when adopted and exists in the past as a fact,
unaffected by what anyone thinks about it in the present. For publicmeaning originalists, constitutional meaning is always ontologically
“there” in the past to be found, even if their epistemological method
sometimes fails to find it.
The fixation thesis underwrites the powerful rhetoric of fidelity that
public-meaning originalists deploy against nonoriginalists, whom they
deride for “making up” constitutional meaning without any interpretive
theory: “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”
But there is a theory that contests public-meaning originalism, though
most public-meaning originalists ignore it. Philosophical hermeneutics
maintains that the meaning of any text is constituted by the present as
well as the past. If this claim is true, then the fixation thesis must be false
because the original public meaning of the Constitution could not exist in
the past as a fact unaffected by the present. And if original public meaning
is not “there” in the past to be found, public-meaning originalists are
“making it up,” too, for no theory can discover meaning that does not
exist.
The few public-meaning originalists who address hermeneutics
mistake it for a criticism of public-meaning methodology. But
hermeneutics claims that the original public meaning does not exist, not
that public-meaning methods do not work: original public meaning is
simply not “there” in the past to be found. It doesn’t take an interpretive
theory to beat public-meaning originalism—an ontology will do.
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INTRODUCTION: IT DOESN’T TAKE A THEORY
Originalists contend that judges properly interpret the Constitution
only when they discover and apply its original meaning.1 They initially
looked for this meaning in the intentions of the framers, 2 but most have
abandoned intent for “original public meaning”—how the public
understood the Constitution at the time it was adopted.3 This “publicmeaning” or “new” originalism claims to be the most widely held theory
of constitutional interpretation.4 Evidently, we’re all public-meaning
originalists now.
A crucial premise of public-meaning originalism is the transparently
named “fixation thesis,” which holds that the meaning of any

1. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
LIBERTY 4 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION]; ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 5–6 (1990); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION]; Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism 173 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Paper No. 0724, 2008) [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism], https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244
[https://perma.cc/KP9E-2MYV].
2. E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 17, 22 (1971); Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address to the American Bar
Association House of Delegates (July 9, 1985), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
ag/legacy/2011/08/23/07-09-1985.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFT5-9HRD]. See generally Richard S.
Kay, Adherence to Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and
Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988) (criticizing the reasons given by contemporary scholars
against adhering to the original intentions of the framers).
3. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 647 (1999)
[hereinafter Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists]. Professor Lawson was the first to suggest
this move. See Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 21, 22 (1988).
Most other originalists followed. See, e.g., BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at
92; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1997); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 1, at 35; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–33 (2003); Michael W.
McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1758 (2015) [hereinafter
McConnell, Interpretation]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 751, 756, 761 (2009); Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism,
73 MO. L. REV. 969, 970 (2008); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–619
(2008) (5–4 decision) (majority opinion by Scalia, J.) (documenting the “normal and ordinary”
meaning of the text of the Second Amendment when adopted in 1791 and applied to the states in
1868).
Although initially a framers-understanding originalist, see supra note 2 and accompanying
text, Judge Bork later converted to public-meaning originalism, see BORK, supra note 1, at 144.
4. Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 3, at 613; McGinnis & Rappaport,
supra note 3, at 761; Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 375, 380 (2013) [hereinafter Whittington, Critical Introduction]; Solum, supra note 1, at 4.
This Article uses “new originalism” and “public-meaning originalism” interchangeably.
OF
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constitutional text is fixed when the text is adopted and cannot change.5
It follows that the present and its concerns cannot affect constitutional
meaning. This is a feature of public-meaning originalism, not a bug:
constitutions are put into writing precisely to constrain government,6
“locking in” or “fixing” rules of law that bind it.7 Judges must discover
the meaning of a written constitution in the past; they may not
manufacture it in the present.8 All originalists accept the fixation thesis,9
which distinguishes originalism from other interpretive theories.10
Public-meaning originalism claims that the original public meaning of
the Constitution is epistemologically discoverable.11 For public-meaning
originalists, the original public meaning is an objective fact in the
world,12 which public-meaning method can recover as a fact, untainted
by the interpreter’s concerns in the present.13 Gaps and ambiguities in the
5. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The Fixation Thesis]; see also
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1130 (noting that “the meaning of the words and phrases of
the Constitution is fixed,” unless changed by amendment).
6. BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 103.
7. See id. at 105–06 (“If . . . a constitution . . . is reduced to writing and executed, where it
speaks it establishes or ‘locks in’ a rule of law from that moment forward.”); SCALIA, supra note
3, at 40 (“One would suppose that the rule that a text does not change would apply a fortiori to a
constitution. . . . [I]ts whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in such a
manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”); WHITTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 54 (“[O]nly a fixed text can provide judicial instruction and
therefore be judicially enforceable against legislative encroachment.”); id. at 56 (“The
constitutional constraint on the people’s agents can emerge from the text as intended . . . only if
the text has the fixed meaning it is uniquely capable of carrying.”); Ramsey, supra note 3, at 973,
976 (Constitutional meaning must be “anchored in the text.”).
8. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 5–11.
9. Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 4, 30; see Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation
and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011); Whittington, Critical Introduction,
supra note 4, at 378.
10. See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 38.
11. Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411,
416–17 (2013) [hereinafter Barnett, Gravitational Force]. “Epistemology” is the study of what
we can know and how we can know it. ANTHONY KENNY, A NEW HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 118 (2010); see, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Posterior Analytics (G.R.G. Mure trans.), in THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 108, 183–84 ii.19 99b20-100a14 (Richard McKeon ed., 6th prtg.
1941) (arguing that one knows the world through sense perception).
All citations to Aristotle are to the page number in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra,
followed by the Roman numeral of the book, the Arabic number of the chapter, and, if applicable,
the Bekker line number(s).
12. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply
to Professor Griffin 41 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Paper No. 08-12,
2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1130665 [https://perma.cc/QP5Y-V3ZZ].
13. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics,
Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621 [hereinafter Solum,
Triangulating Public Meaning] (arguing that the original public meaning of the Constitution can
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historical record sometimes prevent this recovery,14 but the existence of
original public meaning remains, unaffected by the inability to find it.
Public-meaning originalism rests on this ontological assumption, that
the original public meaning of the Constitution is a fact existing in the
world of the past, untouched by the present and its concerns.15 The
fixation thesis presupposes that original public meaning is an object
existing independently of the present, always “there” in the past to be
found. So, when a question arises about the meaning of the Constitution,
one need only recur to the “fact” of its original public meaning to find the
answer. As Randy Barnett puts it, “there is (á la Gertrude Stein) a there
there potentially to resolve the conflict.”16
Why does this matter? Public-meaning originalists insist that only
judges who recover and apply the original public meaning are faithful to
the Constitution;17 judges who decide cases on some other
(nonoriginalist) basis are not “interpreting” the Constitution, but “making
up” its meaning to suit their personal preferences.18 This rhetorical move
installs public-meaning originalism as the status quo, allocating to
nonoriginalists the burden of dislodging it with some alternate method
(or, as new originalists often taunt, “It takes a theory to beat a theory,”
and nonoriginalists don’t have one).19 But if the original public meaning
be objectively recovered by a three-part methodology employing corpus linguistics, immersion in
the linguistic and conceptual world in which the Constitution was adopted, and deep study of the
Constitution’s drafting and ratification process and early implementation).
14. E.g., Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 11, at 416; Ramsey, supra note 3, at 971;
Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 12; Whittington, Critical Introduction, supra note 4,
at 403.
15. “Ontology” is the study of being or existence, of everything that “is.” KENNY, supra
note 11, at 160; e.g., ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics (W.D. Ross trans.), in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE, supra note 11, at 681, 779 vi.1 1026a15-16 & -30-33 (“[T]he first science deals
with . . . being qua being—both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.”).
16. Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 11, at 416.
17. E.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, 103–04, 107; WHITTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 56; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 4. See also
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 NYU L. REV. 1, 91 (2009) (“[O]ne frequently finds
Originalism championed as the theory of integrity, honesty, and candor.”); Thomas B. Colby &
Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 280 (2009) (“[O]riginalists of every stripe
have insisted unfailingly that theirs is the one true constitutional faith—that only their approach
is legitimate and coherent and properly respects the Constitution and the judiciary’s institutional
role.”).
18. See, e.g., William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349,
2351 (2015); Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2008, 12:01
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122445985683948619 [https://perma.cc/SGY2-W8HC]
(excerpt from Justice Thomas’s Wriston Lecture to the Manhattan Institute). For insightful
criticism of this originalist trope, see Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1185, 1191–1205 (2008).
19. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 74 (2011) (statement of Solum); Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 3,
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of the Constitution does not exist in the past as a fact, then publicmeaning originalists are “making it up” too, for no interpretive method
can find meaning that does not exist. So it actually doesn’t take another
interpretive theory to beat public-meaning originalism—the right
ontology will do.
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the assumption that the original
public meaning of the Constitution exists in the past unaffected by the
present. The meaning of any text from the past is also shaped by the
demands of the interpreter in the present—textual meaning is mutually
constituted by past and present.20 It is precisely the interpretive effort in
the present to understand a text from the past that generates textual
meaning. Pace Professor Barnett (and to paraphrase Stein correctly),21
there isn’t any “there” in the past to yield objective answers to questions
about constitutional meaning.
Consider contemporary discussions about whether the holding of
Brown v. Board of Education is within the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.22 In Brown, the Court famously held that racial
segregation in public education violated the Amendment, but declined to
rest on the Clause’s original meaning because the Fourteenth Amendment
was not generally understood to prohibit racially segregated public
schools when adopted in 1868.23 This remains the scholarly consensus.24
In the years since it was decided, Brown has become constitutional
scripture: any constitutional scholar whose interpretive theory calls
Brown into question risks rejection of herself and her theory.25 No one
escapes this effect; as Robert Bork lamented, even the great Herbert
at 617; see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855 (1989)
(“[N]onoriginalism confronts a practical difficulty reminiscent of the truism of elective politics
that ‘You can’t beat somebody with nobody.’”).
20. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 335 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., Bloomsbury Acad. paperback ed. 2013) (1960) [hereinafter GADAMER,
TRUTH & METHOD].
21. See GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937) (lamenting that there
was little point to writing about her hometown because “there is no there there”).
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1955) (based on a research memorandum on Brown written while a
clerk to Justice Frankfurter). Compare Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.”), with id. at 492 (“[W]e cannot turn back the clock to 1868 when the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 132–46 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and
Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995);
Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor
McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 229–31 (1996); Ronald Turner, Justice Antonin Scalia’s
Flawed Originalist Justification for Brown v. Board of Education, 9 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 179,
180 (2017).
25. See Colby & Smith, supra note 17, at 299 & nn.281–82.
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Wechsler was attacked for his suggestion that Brown lacked a neutral
doctrinal justification.26
To remain viable in this environment, public-meaning originalism
required a public-meaning defense of Brown, and several were duly
produced.27 It’s hardly unfair to question whether the imperative of
defending public-meaning originalism motivated these defenses or
influenced their readings of the historical record.
My point is not just that one’s personal acceptance of Brown’s
principle of racial equality influences how she understands the Fourteenth
Amendment; the elevation of Brown also influences whether she accepts
this principle in the first place. Understanding a text from the past always
includes one’s relationship to it in the present: Who we are affects how
we understand the Constitution, but how the Constitution has come to be
understood affects who we are. Contemporary public-meaning
originalists have to take account of the canonization of Brown in their
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but as persons already
committed to racial equality as the result of Brown’s influence, they want
to take this account.
Although philosophical hermeneutics attacks the very assumption that
underwrites the fixation thesis—that original public meaning rests in the
past as an independently existing fact—public-meaning originalists have
almost entirely ignored it. Those few who have engaged it have treated it
as a challenge to the discoverability of original public meaning rather
than to its existence.28 This, too, has gone almost entirely unexamined in
the literature.29

26. BORK, supra note 1, at 78–79 (discussing Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–35 (1959)).
27. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of
Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429 (2015); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Originalism &
Desegregation]. Professor McConnell’s public-meaning defense of Brown and Professor Solum’s
use of it are discussed in Section IV.C.
28. See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 74–76, 92–94, 102–08; Lawrence
B. Solum, Originalism, Hermeneutics, and the Fixation Thesis [hereinafter Solum, Hermeneutics
and the Fixation Thesis], in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN
ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 130 (Brian G. Slocum ed.,
2017) [hereinafter LEGAL INTERPRETATION].
29. The only direct criticism is a short but incisive book chapter by Professor Mootz. See
generally Francis J. Mootz III, Getting Over the Originalist Fixation [hereinafter Mootz,
Originalist Fixation], in LEGAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 28, at 156 (criticizing Solum,
Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28). Professor Mootz offers ontological
criticism of original-intent originalism in Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal
Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and
Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988) [hereinafter Mootz, Legal Hermeneutics].
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This Article argues that the fixation thesis is false. Part I provides a
detailed exposition of the thesis and the ontological assumptions on
which it rests. Part II discusses the hermeneutic challenge to fixation
afforded by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s approach to interpretation and
understanding, in particular his argument that one’s interpretation of a
text is necessarily structured by her prior relation to it.30 Part III shows
how public-meaning originalists incorrectly read Gadamer
epistemologically rather than ontologically, misunderstanding his
argument as a critique of public-meaning methodology rather than a
rejection of the “objective” existence of textual meaning in the past. Part
IV criticizes examples deployed by new originalists against
hermeneutics, showing how they actually demonstrate the improbability
of the fixation thesis. The Conclusion briefly discusses the dubious claim
of new originalists that they alone are faithful to the Constitution.
I. THE FIXATION THESIS
The fixation thesis provides that two sets of facts fix the meaning of
any constitutional clause at its adoption: facts about the semantics of the
text and facts about the context surrounding the text and its adoption.31
A. Semantics
The Constitution is written in clauses, which constitute the basic unit
of public-meaning analysis.32 Each word in a constitutional clause
possesses an ordinary linguistic meaning established by widespread

A few commentators have noted the ontological assumption underlying fixation without
discussing it further. See, e.g., BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 19, at 107 (observation of Bennett);
Berman, supra note 17, at 7; Vivienne Brown, Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and
Philosophy of Mind, 1 J. PHIL. HIST. 25, 60 (2007); Daniel S. Goldberg, Comment, And the Walls
Came Tumbling Down: How Classical Scientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of Textualism
and Originalism, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 463, 494 (2002); Rik Peters, Constitutional Interpretation: A
View from a Distance, 50 HIST. & THEORY 117, 117 (2011).
30. See generally GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20; HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge ed. & trans. 1976) [hereinafter GADAMER,
HERMENEUTICS]; HANS-GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE (Frederick G.
Lawrence trans., 1981) [hereinafter GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE]. Section II.B.3.a is drawn from
Frederick Mark Gedicks, It’s a Wonderful Originalism! Lawrence Solum and the Thesis of
Immaculate Recovery, 31 DPCE ONLINE 653 (2017), http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/
dpceonline/article/view/438/426 [https://perma.cc/JTY3-KTYH].
31. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 13, at 1630–31; see Ramsey, supra
note 3, at 974; Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 28.
32. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 50–51; see also VICTORIA NOURSE,
MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 113 (2016) (“[O]rdinary meaning, from a semantic
perspective, requires at least a full sentence.”).
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patterns of English usage existing at the time the clause was adopted.33
Rules of syntax and grammar in force at adoption dictate how these words
fit together as a statement.34 Ordinary meaning, syntax, and grammar in
use at the time of adoption, evidenced by contemporaneous usage in
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, dictionaries, statutes, judicial
decisions, and other public writing, constitute and fix the original
semantic meaning of a clause—the meaning people of the time would
have understood solely from the words of the clause.35
Public-meaning originalists maintain that once fixed in a written
constitutional clause, semantic meaning exists in the past as a fact. This
entails the claims that original semantic meaning is both objective and
stable; it exists independently of human thought, and any person who
undertakes to investigate it will find the same thing.36 As Professor
Barnett declares, “[T]he English language contains words with generally
accepted meanings that are ascertainable independent of any of our
subjective opinions about their meaning.”37 Similar references to the
33. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 60; see McConnell, Interpretation, supra
note 3, at 1757. The view that semantic meaning is stable at the moment of utterance has not gone
unchallenged. See, e.g., PETER LUDLOW, LIVING WORDS: MEANING UNDERDETERMINATION AND
THE DYNAMIC LEXICON 3 (2014) (arguing that semantic meaning is generally underdeterminate
and contested, often within the same conversation); see also J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS
WITH WORDS 100 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975) (“[F]or some years we have
been realizing more and more clearly that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that
the words used are to some extent to be ‘explained’ by the ‘context’ in which they are designed
to be or have actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange. Yet still perhaps we are too prone
to give these explanations in terms of ‘the meanings of the words.’”); J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 62 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 2d ed. 1970) (“[T]here is no simple and handy
appendage of a word called ‘the meaning of (the word) “x.”’”).
The instability of semantic meaning is a particular problem in written utterances because
writing enables the severance of the utterance from its author, its addressee, and the rest of its
initial context. See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR, FROM TEXT TO ACTION: ESSAYS IN HERMENEUTICS, II, at
54–55, 84–85, 108 (Kathleen Blamey & John B. Thompson trans., Nw. Univ. Press 2007) (1986)
(observing that semantic meaning is especially unstable in written discourse); JACQUES DERRIDA,
Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC 1, 3 (Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman trans., Nw.
Univ. Press 1988) (1977) (arguing, inter alia, that context can never completely determine the
meaning of written communication).
34. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 51.
35. See BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 93; McConnell, Interpretation,
supra note 3, at 1755; Ramsey, supra note 3, at 974.
36. See NICOLA ABBAGNANO, DIZIONARIO DI FILOSOFIA 379 (2d ed. 1971) (author’s
translation): A “fact” is
an objective possibility of verification . . . , in the sense that anyone can verify it
oneself given the same conditions. “It is a fact that x” means that x can be verified
or ascertained by anyone in possession of the appropriate means, or can be
consistently described or predicted.
37. BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 105.
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“factual” and “objective” character of original semantic meaning abound
in the public-meaning literature.38
Public-meaning originalists often use the Domestic Violence Clause
to illustrate the role semantics plays in fixing original meaning.39 This
Clause provides, “The United States . . . shall protect each of [the
states] . . . on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when
the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”40 Today
“domestic violence” commonly means physical or sexual abuse by one
family member of another.41 This usage was unknown when the
Domestic Violence Clause and the rest of the original Constitution were
adopted in the late 1780s42—indeed, many actions now considered
abusive were then numbered among the prerogatives of male heads of
household.43
The fixation thesis holds that the meaning of “domestic violence” was
fixed when the Domestic Violence Clause was adopted. Thus, the original
semantic meaning of the Clause cannot include contemporary
understandings of “domestic violence” like spousal or child abuse. Later
changes in usage—“linguistic drift”—do not change the original
38. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 17 (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris.”); Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 11, at 415 (“New
Originalism . . . seeks to establish an empirical fact about the objective meaning of the text at a
particular point in time . . . .”); Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 28 (“The public
meaning of the text that was proposed in 1787 was necessarily determined in large part by the
conventional semantic meanings of the words and phrases that make up the text and the
regularities of usage that are sometimes summarized as rules of grammar and syntax.
Conventional semantic meanings and syntax are determined by linguistic facts—that is, by
regularities in usage.”).
This factual and objective meaning need not even coincide with the understanding of actual
people who lived at the time. Ironically, given their accusation that nonoriginalists are “making it
up,” many public-meaning originalists construct a hypothetical reader in their analyses of original
semantic meaning. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise,
23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (“[W]hen interpreting the Constitution, the touchstone is not
the specific thoughts in the heads of any particular historical people . . . but rather the hypothetical
understandings of a reasonable person who is artificially constructed by lawyers.”); see also
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1132 (“[The term originalism] is in reference to the original,
non-idiosyncratic meaning of words and phrases in the Constitution: how the words and phrases,
and structure . . . would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably wellinformed reader . . . .”).
39. See, e.g., Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 11, at 416; Solum, The Fixation
Thesis, supra note 5, at 16–17.
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
41. Domestic Violence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/domestic%20violence [https://perma.cc/5EFN-ZJM4].
42. See id.
43. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2122–25, 2129–30 (1996).
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semantic meaning because this meaning was fixed at the Clause’s
adoption.44
B. Context
Original semantic meaning is rarely sufficient to resolve constitutional
cases.45 Public-meaning originalists acknowledge the necessity of
supplementing the original semantics of the text with its context—
additional relevant information that specifies the original semantic
meaning.46 Just as the original semantic meaning of the Constitution is
time-bound, so is its context, consisting of those circumstances known by
or available to the public at the time the Constitution was adopted.47 This
“publicly available context” consists of textual context and historical
context.
1. Textual
The location of a clause in the constitutional text—which clauses
surround it, how a clause is grammatically marked off from others, the
section and article in which a clause is placed—affects its meaning.48
Again, the Domestic Violence Clause is illustrative. It forms part of a
longer sentence containing several clauses: “The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,
and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.”49
Preceded immediately by the Invasion Clause, which obligates the
United States to repel any forceful occupation of a state originating
outside its borders, the Domestic Violence Clause takes up the analogous
problem of violent rebellions occurring within a state’s borders. The
location of the Domestic Violence Clause immediately after the Invasion
44. Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 17.
45. See NOURSE, supra note 32, at 107, 133; Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra
note 13, at 1632; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting the importance of context
to written utterance).
46. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 37; WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at
35, 60; Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 28. See generally P.F. Strawson, On
Referring, 59 MIND 320, 336 (1950) (The “context” of an utterance includes “the time, the place,
the situation, the identity of the speaker, the subjects which form the immediate focus of interest,
and the personal histories of both the speaker and those he is addressing.”).
47. See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 28; see also WHITTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 35, 60.
48. See BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 105; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 6 (1999)
[hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION]; Ramsey, supra note 3, at 972; Solum, Semantic
Originalism, supra note 1, at 54.
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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Clause offers confirmation that “domestic violence” means violent
rebellions originating within a state against its legitimate authority.50
2. Historical
Each clause of the Constitution was adopted at a particular time and
place by particular groups in light of particular political imperatives and
social considerations. Public-meaning originalism requires retrieval of
this historical context “to elucidate the understanding of the terms
involved and to indicate the principles that were supposed to be embodied
in them.”51
The Domestic Violence Clause once again provides a useful
illustration. While the United States was governed by the Articles of
Confederation from 1781 to 1789, the states were bedeviled by internal
rebellions, euphemistically called by the people “out-of-doors.”52 These
ranged from organized attacks on state governments, such as Shays’
Rebellion, to mobs of local citizens.53 At the Philadelphia Convention,
Federalists insisted that the newly conceived federal government be
vested with sufficient military power and constitutional authority to
extinguish these rebellions and mob actions.54
The historical context surrounding adoption of the Domestic Violence
Clause thus confirms that “domestic violence” refers to anti-government
violence within a state, precluding the contemporary sense of child and
spousal abuse in favor of a federal obligation to deploy resources, upon
state request, to put down violent intrastate rebellions.
*

*

*

The fixation thesis holds that the meaning of any constitutional clause
is fixed when the clause is adopted, by the semantic meaning of the clause
and the context surrounding its adoption. This fixed original meaning
exists in the past as an objective fact, independently of the present and its
concerns.
II. ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
Gadamer directly challenges the fixation thesis in Truth and Method,
easily the most consequential work on textual interpretation in the
50. Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising Originalism: The Regula Lecture, 9 CONLAWNOW
235, 242–43 (2018) [hereinafter Solum, Surprising Originalism].
51. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 35.
52. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 319–28
(1998).
53. Id. at 325–27.
54. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 1789–
1815, at 111 (2009).
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twentieth century,55 as even some public-meaning originalists
acknowledge.56 Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s ontology in Being and
Time,57 Gadamer argues that textual meaning is mutually constituted by
past and present.58 This directly contradicts the fixation thesis, which
assumes that constitutional meaning exists in the past, unaffected by the
present. If Gadamer is right, then the meaning of a text from the past
cannot exist, unless and until someone in the present interacts with it and
thereby contributes the necessary present component to textual meaning.

55. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 34 (1983); JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS 2 (Joel Weinsheimer trans., Yale Univ. Press 1994) (1991); JOEL C.
WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND METHOD, at ix (1985).
Important criticisms of Truth and Method in English include Emilio Betti, Hermeneutics as the
General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften [hereinafter Betti, Hermeneutics], in JOSEF
BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY AND
CRITIQUE 51, 58–73 (1980), and E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION app. II 245–64
(1967). Betti, Hermeneutics, supra, draws its principal themes from EMILIO BETTI, TEORIA
GENERALE DELLA INTERPRETAZIONE (2nd ed., 1992) (1955) (2 vols.) [hereinafter BETTI, TEORIA
GENERALE].
56. See, e.g., Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 145 (“HansGeorg Gadamer produced a powerful and influential theory of hermeneutics in . . . Truth and
Method.”).
57. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 255–64 (discussing MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, SEIN UND ZEIT [BEING AND TIME] (1927)); see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 113
(arguing that Gadamer made explicit Heidegger’s implicit claims for ontology and the universality
of hermeneutics).
Some years ago I attended a lecture at BYU by the late Hubert Dreyfus, an influential
Heidegger scholar. As I remember, Dreyfus called Heidegger the “most important philosopher of
the 20th century” and a “despicable human being.” This seems correct, then and now. Heidegger
engaged in a notorious collaboration with the Nazi regime in 1933 and 1934, for which he never
apologized or expressed regret; the recent publication of his journal-like “black notebooks,”
containing scattered anti-Semitic entries between 1931 and 1940, has added fuel to this fire. See
Philip Oltermann, Heidegger’s “Black Notebooks” Reveal Antisemitism at Core of His
Philosophy, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/
mar/13/martin-heidegger-black-notebooks-reveal-nazi-ideology-antisemitism [https://perma.cc/
N5AX-LM82]. And yet, much of his work, especially Being and Time, contains stunning
philosophical insights.
Brian Leiter once suggested that, whatever the influence of Nazism on Heidegger’s later
work—which Leiter believes is considerable—important philosophical themes in early works like
Being and Time (published in 1927) seem unrelated to it. Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory
of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253, 262 n.35 (1996) (referring to themes developed by Dreyfus).
Among these themes are Being and Time’s critique of Cartesian epistemology and its ontological
argument for “Being-in-the-world,” both of which inform Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
See infra Section II.B. See generally HUBERT L. DREYFUS, BEING-IN-THE-WORLD: A
COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME, DIVISION I, at 3–8 (1991).
58. See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 301.
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A. The Circularity of Human Understanding
Heidegger rejected the conceptual separation of the human subject
from its objects of knowledge,59 which underwrites so much of Western
thought.60 His fundamental claim is that subjects and objects have no
existence outside of their relationships with each other;61 human beings
have a prior involvement with every person and thing they seek to
understand.62 We are not independently existing subjects who must break
out of inner consciousness to understand the independently existing
world outside; rather, we are always, at every moment, already out in the
world alongside other persons and things.63 Human “being,” in this view,
is a “being-there,”64 a “being-in-the-world.”65 As Brian Leiter explains,
the world is constituted “precisely by the practical involvements we have
with the things and people in it.”66

59. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 129, 131 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson
trans., Harper & Row, Publishers 1962) (1927) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME].
60. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the
Self, in 7 A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 144, 153–67 (1988).
In the conventional “Cartesian” view, each of us exists “inside” ourselves, in our subjective
minds, while “outside” is the objectively real world. See RENÉ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST
PHILOSOPHY (1641), reprinted in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY
45, 49–53 (Donald A. Cress trans., 3d ed. 1993); see also KENNY, supra note 11, at 528 (attributing
to Descartes the conceptualization of “mind and matter as the two great mutually exclusive and
mutually exhaustive divisions of the universe”). This separation created an epistemological
problem: how can the merely subjective “in-here” know the objectively real “out-there”? A
perpetual preoccupation became how to bridge this gap between mind and matter. See, e.g.,
DESCARTES, supra, at 50. Heidegger did so with an ontology that denied that subjects and objects
exist apart from each other in the first place. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE METAPHYSICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC 160–61, 167 (Michael Heim trans. 1984) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER,
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS] (lectures from 1928) (Ind. Univ. Press 1984).
For a pre-Heideggerian defense of Cartesian dualism, see generally Henry Bliss, The SubjectObject Relation, 26 PHIL. REV. 395 (1917).
61. See HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 59, at 125 (criticizing the Cartesian subject
as existing “in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be”); see also Harrison Hall,
Intentionality and World: Division I of Being and Time, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
HEIDEGGER 122, 135 (Charles B. Guignon ed., 1993) (observing that for Heidegger human being
is inseparable from the being of the world).
62. See WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, S.J., HEIDEGGER: THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY TO
THOUGHT 85 (3d ed. 1974); SOLOMON, supra note 60, at 162.
63. HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 59, at 88–89.
64. Id. at 153–57 (emphasis added). “Being-there” is the customary English translation of
Dasein, a German noun upon whose verb form Heidegger plays for a fresh conception of the
freighted term “human being.” See “dasein,” in THE OXFORD-DUDEN GERMAN DICTIONARY 191
(W. Scholze-Stubenrecht & J.B. Sykes eds., 1994) [hereinafter OXFORD GERMAN DICTIONARY]
(intransitive verb meaning “to be”). I’ve retained “human being” and “human being-in-the-world”
for their accessibility to nonspecialists.
65. HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 59, at 80, 107, 141 (emphasis added).
66. Leiter, supra note 57, at 271.
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Being-in-the-world precludes purely objective knowledge. We cannot
grasp the meaning and significance of things in the world independently
of who we are and what we preliminarily know about them,67 because we
are bound up with them in already-existing relationships that shape our
understanding of them.68
Nevertheless, the impossibility of pure objectivity does not end in the
solipsism of pure subjectivity. We cannot make of the world anything we
wish. While one’s presuppositions of meaning shape one’s understanding
of the world, the “brute facts” of the world—including its physical
reality—also make their claims on understanding;69 we find ourselves
thrown into situations open to some possibilities of existence but closed
off to others.70 We participate with the world in creating the meaning of
our existence. This does not mean that subjectivity or objectivity
vanishes, only that they combine in our understanding. One’s choices
among possibilities give her life meaning, but this meaning determines
the possibilities she finds attractive enough to choose. For Heidegger,
understanding is always self-understanding, interpretation always selfinterpretation.71

67. HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 59, at 191–92; see also id. at 190–91 (“[W]hen
something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an
involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one
which gets laid out by the interpretation of the thing.”).
68. Id. at 191–92 (“An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of
something presented to us. If . . . one likes to appeal . . . to what ‘stands there,’ then one finds that
what ‘stands there’ in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed
assumption . . . of the person who does the interpreting.” (footnote omitted)).
69. Heidegger and other anti-foundationist philosophers, notably Richard Rorty, are
sometimes accused of denying that physical reality exists independently of human thought. See,
e.g., Douglas V. Porpora, Nonreductive Materialism and the Materialisms of Marx and
Heidegger, 5 HUM. STUD. 13, 28 (1982). This is a gross misreading of both Heidegger and Rorty,
in my opinion, but it has little relevance to my argument here. While investigation of physical
reality involves hermeneutic challenges, see generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962), these are greatly multiplied in investigations of textual meaning:
humans investigating the meaning of texts authored by other humans is circular or reflexive in a
way that humans investigating physical reality is not. Whatever the “being” of a rock, we can be
certain it is not human being.
70. Heidegger calls this the “facticity” of the world, HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note
59, at 82 (emphasis omitted), to avoid the Cartesian implications of “factual.” We cannot become
anything we wish, although precisely how our possibilities and limitations interact with our
choices is never fixed in advance as “factual” might imply. See DREYFUS, supra note 57, at 44,
119; David Couzens Hoy, Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO HEIDEGGER, supra note 61, at 170, 179–80.
71. Hoy, supra note 70, at 188–90; see DREYFUS, supra note 57, at 189.
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B. The Circularity of Textual Understanding
Gadamer adapted Heidegger’s ontology to textual interpretation in
Truth and Method.72 Just as human being-in-the-world implies the
circularity or reflexivity of human understanding, the interpretation of
texts has the same character.
1. The Problem of the Circle
Reformation theologians held that the meaning of the Bible is
constituted by its individual parts, but the meaning of each such part is
constituted by its place in the Bible.73 This “hermeneutic circle” is an
illustrative metaphor of Gadamer’s account of textual understanding,
according to which meaning has this circular character in all of the
“human sciences.”74
Suppose I am an expert in classical philosophy reviewing a book
about Plato. A review setting out only my own views of Plato, without
considering the book’s approach and its place in the classical tradition,
would not be a review of the book. At the same time, it would be absurd
to write the review as if I had no views about Plato and no knowledge of
the tradition and its critics. Nor can I neutralize how the tradition and its
critics have informed my view of Plato, or how my views might have
reciprocally influenced the tradition and the critics. I do not exist in
“intellectual nowhere,” without any preconceptions of the book.75 In
short, how I understand the book depends on its place within the classical
tradition that has also shaped my own views about Plato. But I am also a
participant in this tradition, and thus have influenced the very tradition
that influences me.
The methodological problem of the circle is this: It seems that textual
interpretation in the human sciences cannot yield knowledge, because it
72. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 278–317.
73. More specifically, the meaning of any particular biblical text is constituted by its place
in the history of salvation recounted in the Bible, but the meaning of this history is itself
constituted by each biblical text—the aphorisms, miracles, parables, poems, and stories
contributing to the whole of salvation history. HANS W. FREI, THE ECLIPSE OF BIBLICAL
NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HERMENEUTICS 172–83 (1974).
74. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS
3, 6, 50 (1971). “Human sciences” is a common translation of the German Geisteswissenschaften,
whose sense is somewhat broader than the English “humanities,” including as well law and most
of what are now known as the “social sciences.” See, e.g., RICHARD E. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS:
INTERPRETATION THEORY IN SCHLEIERMACHER, DILTHEY, HEIDEGGER, AND GADAMER 98 (1969).
The term literally translates as “sciences of the spirit,” which refers to those areas of study in
which humans interpret other humans and their work rather than natural objects or phenomena.
See generally “Geist,” “Geisteswissenschaften,” and “Wissenschaft,” in OXFORD GERMAN
DICTIONARY, supra note 64, at 319, 811.
75. See Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 29, at 161–62 (“Apprehending a text as a
static and closed meaning from the past would require an interpreter from nowhere.”).
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has no objective, noncircular foundation. Every text is encased in a
tradition, which preconditions how readers understand both the text and
themselves, at the same time that readers themselves contribute to this
same tradition by interpreting the texts that form it, including the text they
are currently interpreting.76
2. The Promise of the Circle
As Heidegger argued that our pre-existing relations with the world
condition how we understand it, so Gadamer maintains that comparable
preconceptions about the meaning of a text—he calls them “prejudices”
in the sense of prejudgments—shape how we understand it.77 Gadamer
dealt with this circularity by embracing it. The circle is not a “problem”
for textual understanding, but the condition of its possibility. Interpretive
neutrality is impossible.78 We cannot free ourselves from traditions and
the textual preconceptions they engender, to see traditions and texts “as
they really are,” independently of our understandings of them or their
influence on us. Instead, we are always within traditions, which shape
how we understand ourselves as well as the texts we interpret. 79 Thus,
our preconceptions of a text’s meaning are the only basis on which we
can initially understand anything about it.80
Gadamer illustrates this with the concept of the classical. “Classical”
here refers generically to the height of achievement, an exemplar of the
perfect.81 This sense of “classical” depends on both past and present; one
cannot describe a past summit of literature or art as “classic” without the
sense of a present in relative decline.82 When we encounter a “classic”—
say, a Shakespearean play—we are predisposed to regard it as
exceptional, and simultaneously to regard contemporary works as
diminished by comparison. Our understanding of a classical work,
therefore, “will always involve more than merely historically
76. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 74, at 6:
What we are trying to establish is a certain reading of a text or expression, and
what we appeal to as our grounds for this reading can only be other readings. We
are trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to
readings of its partial expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning,
with making sense, where expressions only make sense or not in relation to
others, the readings of partial expressions depend on those of others, and
ultimately of the whole.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 284.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 45.
GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 294.
See id. at 279.
Id. at 297, 299.
Id. at 301 (“[T]he classical [is] . . . preservation amid the ruins of time.”).
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reconstructing the past ‘world’ to which the work belongs.”83 There is
always also the sense that the world of the work and the world that calls
it “classic” are connected, that “we too belong to that world, and
correlatively that the work too belongs to our world.”84
The idea of the classical illustrates how the circular structure of
understanding constitutes meaning from both past and present. The
metaphor of the hermeneutic circle captures the dialogical relation of the
text (from the past) with the interpreter (in the present). “Understanding”
means to grasp the content expressed by the text in the past, from one’s
own place in the present.85 Our current preconceptions are our only means
of connecting with the classical past, as a height of achievement which
necessarily presupposes a perception of current decline. The “real
meaning of a text,” therefore, is determined by both the original situation
of the author and her audience and the present situation of the
interpreter.86
3. Two Examples
What would it mean for “original public meaning” not to exist, for
textual meaning to be a function of present as well as past, as Gadamer
maintains? A classic American film, It’s a Wonderful Life,87 and a
canonical Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education,88
illustrate Gadamer’s account of textual meaning and show that it directly
challenges the account of meaning presupposed by the fixation thesis.
a. It’s a Wonderful Life
Imagine trying to “discover” the original public meaning of It’s a
Wonderful Life, a popular 1946 comedy/drama that tells the life story of
the bright and talented George Bailey, thwarted at every turn in his
burning ambition to leave the provincial “Bedford Falls” of his youth,
until a series of improbable events shows that, despite all, his is a
wonderful life.89
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 306.
86. Id. at 307.
87. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. The early part of the film depicts George’s slow abandonment of his dreams. He settles
down with a local girl, Mary Hatch, to start a family. Instead of college, he is trapped into running
his father’s financially beleaguered “Building and Loan,” which grants home mortgages to
working class folks who cannot qualify anywhere else. All this is played mostly for laughs until
a serially incompetent relative employed at the Building and Loan loses $8,000 of its funds, over
$100,000 in current dollars. Unable to replace the missing money and facing bankruptcy and ruin,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/2

18

Gedicks: The "Fixation Thesis" and Other Falsehoods

2020]

THE “FIXATION THESIS” AND OTHER FALSEHOODS

237

In the more than seventy years since the film was released, it has
become embedded in a tradition that necessarily shapes how a person in
the present can approach its meaning. It is universally acclaimed,90 a
“classic” that captures all the crises and courage of the “greatest
generation,” which endured the flu epidemic, the Great Depression, and
the war against fascism. It is a powerfully nostalgic representation of a
simpler, more faithful America that defined success by belief and family,
not fame or fortune.
All of this affects how one can engage the film today. Most
contemporary critics praise it; those who dislike it come off as grumps.
Either way, one must reckon with what the film has become—what it is
now, not what it was at its release in 1946. We in the present are not pure
subjects who can see the film’s narrative of George’s life as a pure object,
because we are at every moment already within the tradition that
surrounds the film and shapes our present understanding of it.
This is particularly evident in the portrayal of Mary, the woman whom
George eventually marries. The film reflects (what we today call) the
sexist assumptions of seven decades past. Mary’s success in life rests on
her marriage to some successful man; her mother is dismayed when Mary
rejects a wealthy, politically connected suitor to drop out of college and
marry the broke and impractical George. But marriage to George fulfills
all of Mary’s dreams—mother, homemaker, helpmeet; at one point she
declares only half-jokingly that she married George to keep from
becoming an “old maid.” Mary is the nurturing, virtuous, domestic
mother devoted to home, husband, and children, naturally unsuited for
life in the real world of aggression, competition, and conflict—the world
of men.
George brings himself to the edge of suicide, despairing at the meaninglessness of his pitiful life
and wishing he had never been born.
The conceit of the film is a bevy of guardian angels keeping watch over George and his
troubles. They send Clarence, a kindly though befuddled junior angel, to “earn his wings” by
saving George from the mortal sin he is about to commit. Clarence does so by half-granting
George’s wish, giving him a tour of Bedford Falls as if George had never been born. The town in
these visions—called “Pottersville” because in George’s absence the wealthy and pitiless Henry
Potter has taken over everything—is bereft of all the good George would have done had he lived.
So horribly grim is the world without him that George begs to return to his real life in Bedford
Falls. The film ends happily, with all the people George touched pitching in to make good the
Building and Loan shortfall and Clarence earning his wings.
90. See Peter Bradshaw, It’s a Wonderful Life, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2007, 6:37 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2007/dec/14/family.drama [https://perma.cc/247S-6KLT];
Michael Wilmington, 5 Films That Are Modern or Would-Be Christmas Classics, CHI. TRIB. (Dec.
21, 2001), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-12-21-0112210380-story.html
[https://perma.cc/D6L3-M4QQ]. The film scores absurdly high marks on review aggregation
websites. See, e.g., Review of It’s a Wonderful Life, ROTTEN TOMATOES, https://www.rotten
tomatoes.com/m/1010792_its_a_wonderful_life? [https://perma.cc/SJ99-CRJQ] (showing 93%
positive reviews from professional film critics and 95% positive from audiences).
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The 1946 reviews did not note these sexist stereotypes,91 not even
reviews in the urban liberal press,92 because in 1946 they were neither
sexist nor stereotypes. Mary’s character captured the tenor of the times,
the then-conventional picture of how women are and what they want,
assumed even by cultural elites. The gender stereotypes are evident to us
in the present because we live in a different world in which this gender
role is no longer the “natural” destiny of women. It is precisely the
contemporary commitment to gender equality that brings into focus
Mary’s portrayal as stereotypically sexist. Without the “prejudice” or
preconception of gender equality, Mary’s character would pass as an
unremarkable reflection of natural female aspiration, as it apparently did
in 1946. A feminist understanding of the film cannot exist until feminism
becomes a noticeable part of the American cultural landscape a
generation later.
A double irony is that gender equality, which creates the film’s sexist
meanings, also produces feminist understandings of certain moments
when Mary acts against type. Mary, not George, offers their honeymoon
savings to rescue the Building and Loan during a Depression bank run.
Mary, not George, buys the dilapidated mansion that becomes their home.
And finally it is Mary—and certainly not George, who by now is off
wallowing in self-pity—who raises the money whose loss put George and
the Building and Loan at the brink of ruin. Indeed, Mary is the only
character in the film besides Potter with any financial know-how.93 Our
present preconception of gender equality creates a feminist meaning for
those of Mary’s actions passed off as merely “spunky” in 1946.
By “objectively” removing our contemporary commitment to gender
equality, were it even possible, we would remove one of the ways we
understand It’s a Wonderful Life, extinguishing both its gender
stereotyping and its proto-feminist moments.

91. See, e.g., Bert Briller, Review: It’s a Wonderful Life, VARIETY (Dec. 16, 1946, 11:00
PM), http://variety.com/1946/film/reviews/it-s-a-wonderful-life-1200414860/ [https://perma.cc/
SQ92-FE66]; Kate Cameron, ‘It’s a Wonderful Life’ Lifts the Spirit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 21,
1946), https://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/movies/wonderful-life-designed-lift-spirits1946-review-article-1.2916205 [https://perma.cc/GC4B-RK9M]; ‘It’s a Wonderful Life’: THR’s
1946 Review, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 6, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
news/a-wonderful-life-1946-movie-754681 [https://perma.cc/XD7F-2J4J].
92. See, e.g., James Agee, Films, 163 THE NATION, Dec. 28, 1946, at 766; Bosley Crowther,
The Screen in Review: At Three Theatres, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 1946), https://www.nytimes.com/
1946/12/23/archives/the-screen-in-review-at-three-threatres-its-a-wonderful-life-with.html
[https://perma.cc/K5BJ-EUZ9]; Current Cinema: Angel of Whimsey, NEW YORKER, Dec. 21,
1946, at 87.
93. See Robert Beuka, Imagining the Postwar Small Town: Gender and the Politics of
Landscape, in It’s a Wonderful Life, 51 J. FILM & VIDEO 36, 41 (1999).
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b. Brown v. Board of Education
Consider again contemporary discussions about whether Brown v.
Board of Education is consistent with the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Bork himself conceded that “no one [in
1868] imagined the equal protection clause might affect school
segregation.”94 Nevertheless, he defended Brown on originalist grounds,
suggesting that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
misunderstood that racial segregation is inconsistent with the principle of
equality constitutionalized by the Clause.95 As Professor Solum later
elaborated this point, we are bound to the public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it was adopted, but not to “factual” errors
the public made about possible applications of that meaning.96
The salient point is not whether Bork’s and Solum’s use of “original
mistake of fact” is consistent with the public-meaning originalism they
espouse (though it is not),97 but why they felt compelled to make this
distinction at all. Bork answered the question himself: the “end of statemandated segregation was the greatest moral triumph constitutional law
had ever produced,” the “high ground of constitutional theory”—“it had
to be right.”98 Then and now, law professors and (especially) aspirants to
the Supreme Court are powerfully influenced to defend the result in
Brown. All theories of constitutional interpretation, no less than publicmeaning originalism, enhance their viability by explaining how they, too,
account for Brown.99
Bork’s and Solum’s arguments exhibit what Gadamer calls (in the
awkward English translation) “working-effective history”—roughly, the
effects that history imposes on interpretation and meaning through
time.100 “Understanding,” Gadamer observes, is a “historically effected
event. . . . [W]e are always already affected by history.”101 We do not
stand outside of the history and events we investigate; what we choose to
examine and how we understand it are influenced by the current effect on
us of the past we examine and seek to understand.102 Consciousness of

94. BORK, supra note 1, at 75.
95. Id. at 82.
96. Solum, Surprising Originalism, supra note 50, at 252–55, 261.
97. See infra Section IV.C.2.
98. BORK, supra note 1, at 77.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
100. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 310–18. David Hoy suggests
“hermeneutical awareness” of history as a less awkward alternative translation. David Couzens
Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
135, 147 (1985).
101. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 310–11 (emphasis omitted).
102. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 142.
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history is consciousness that the interpreter is standing within a historical
situation.103
By 1990, Judge Bork could not have objectively, independently,
dispassionately analyzed whether Brown is consistent with the original
public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, nor could he have
objectively, independently, dispassionately analyzed whether Brown
does or should have the moral authority it now has. By then, Bork was
already entangled in the twin realities that academics (and Supreme Court
nominees) risk their reputations when they criticize or undermine the
result in Brown, and that public-meaning originalism is not a viable
interpretive theory in the current academic environment if it cannot
account for this result. The hermeneutic circle is always at play in
interpretation, even when, like Bork, one doesn’t notice it.
*

*

*

The hermeneutic circle suggested the impossibility of objective
interpretation in the human sciences. Since there is no “God’s Eye” point
of view of the text from which we might understand it “as it really is,”104
our preconceptions, our necessarily prior relationship to the texts we
interpret, are where understanding must start. The hermeneutic circle is
not an obstacle to understanding, but the very condition of its possibility.
III. PUBLIC-MEANING ERRORS
Public-meaning originalists assume that the original public meaning
of the Constitution is a fixed object, resting in the past independently of
the present. By contrast, philosophical hermeneutics maintains that
textual meaning is mutually constituted by past and present—by the text
and tradition by which the text is handed down from the past and by the
contemporary influences of the interpreter and her life and times. In this
view, textual meaning cannot be a fixed object in the past: because
meaning is partially constituted by the present, it necessarily varies with
time. If this is right, the fixation thesis is wrong: fixed textual meaning is
simply not ontologically “there” in the past—it does not exist.
A few public meaning originalists have engaged philosophical
hermeneutics. Keith Whittington and Professor Solum each reject the
hermeneutic contention that the present contributes to constitutional
meaning. Professor Whittington attacks philosophical hermeneutics
directly as a contradiction of the fixation thesis, while Solum
paradoxically maintains that hermeneutic critique and fixed
constitutional meaning are compatible. Nevertheless, they both err in the
103. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 301.
104. Cf. HILLARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 49–50 (1981) (criticizing
metaphysical realism’s “God’s Eye point of view”).
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same way, responding to hermeneutic ontology with mostly
epistemological arguments. This is most evident in their readings of two
crucial parts of Truth and Method: its metaphor of “fused” interpretive
“horizons”105 and its argument that “application” is part of
“interpretation.”106
A. “Horizons”
Perhaps the most famous section of Truth and Method is Gadamer’s
comparison of textual understanding to a “fusion of horizons”—that of
the text in the past and the interpreter in the present.107 Gadamer suggests
that an interpreter’s horizon constitutes a limit beyond which she cannot
see,108 unless she is prompted to question and suspend the preconceptions
prevailing within her horizon.109 Gadamer describes this as being “pulled
up short” by a text whose apparent meaning contradicts one’s
preconceptions.110 An interpreter challenged in this way becomes aware
of interpretive possibilities previously hidden by her horizonal limits.111
Understanding is the fusion of these two horizons, those of the text in the
past and the interpreter in the present.112
Professors Whittington and Solum both mistakenly understand the
interpreter’s horizon as an epistemological obstacle to be overcome, an
impediment to discovering independently existing original meaning fixed
in the horizon of the past. By contrast, Gadamer deploys the metaphor
ontologically, to illustrate how the interpreter’s horizon combines with
that of the text to create textual meaning.
Whittington’s and Solum’s failures to engage hermeneutics
ontologically leaves unanswered its challenge to the fixation thesis:
original public meaning does not exist; there simply is no constitutional
meaning fixed in the past unaffected by the present.

105. See infra Section III.A.
106. See infra Section III.B.
107. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 313–17.
108. Id. at 313.
109. See id. at 302.
110. Id. at 280; see also GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 30, at 92 (“[W]e are guided
by preconceptions and anticipations in our talking in such a way that these continually remain
hidden . . . it takes a disruption in oneself of the intended meaning of what one is saying to become
conscious of these prejudices as such.”).
The phenomenon Gadamer describes suggests the common academic reaction to a
provocative presentation: “I am struck by Professor Smith’s point that . . . .”
111. See GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 30, at 27, 28; GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD,
supra note 20, at 298.
112. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 305.
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1. Epistemological Limit
a. Whittington. Professor Whittington rejects outright the circular
structure of textual understanding espoused by Gadamer.113 He contends
that Gadamer’s account is self-refuting, requiring an interpreter to fuse
incommensurables.114
Drawing on E.D. Hirsch,115 Whittington misreads Gadamer to argue
that a textual interpreter is epistemologically trapped within her own
interpretive horizon, wholly unable to comprehend anything outside it.116
If the interpreter cannot see beyond her horizon, he reasons, she cannot
understand interpretive questions rooted in other horizons,117 making
their fusion with hers impossible.118 Walled off from the horizon of the
text, the interpreter is left as the only available source of textual
meaning.119 In that event, meaning would result from submersion or
disappearance of the text’s horizon into the interpreter’s, not from their
fusion.120
Whittington concludes that the horizonal metaphor is either wrong or
superfluous.121 If the interpreter cannot access the original public
meaning resting outside her textual horizon, there is nothing to fuse with
her horizon. But if the resources within the interpreter’s horizon enable
her to access the textual horizon, she can just as easily discover the
original public meaning resting within it and obviate the need for fusion
altogether.122

113. See supra Section II.B
114. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 102.
115. See HIRSCH, supra note 55, app. II at 252–54.
116. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 103.
117. See id. (Because “interpretation depends upon the resources of an interpretive tradition,
it cannot exceed that tradition.”) (citing HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD 99, 148, 200–
07, 296, 340–44, 374, 390–95 (Sheed & Ward trans. Garett Barden & John Cumming ed. 1975);
DAVID COUZENS HOY, THE CRITICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HISTORY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS 50, 68–72 (1978)). Many of Whittington’s citations to Truth and Method seem
unrelated to the proposition that an interpreter is epistemologically limited by her horizon.
118. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 103.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 103–04.
122.
How can fusion take place unless . . . the original sense of the text has been
understood? [H]ow can it be affirmed that the original sense of a text is beyond
our reach and, at the same time, that valid interpretation is possible? . . . If the
interpreter is really bound by his own historicity, he cannot break out of it into
some halfway house where past and present are merged. [O]nce it is admitted
that the interpreter can adopt a fused perspective different from his own
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b. Solum. Though Professor Solum seeks to demonstrate the
compatibility of fusion with fixation, he, too, reads the interpreter’s
horizon as an epistemological obstacle to textual understanding.123 He
suggests that the interpreter’s horizonal frame may mislead her about the
content of the Constitution’s original public meaning.124 For example,
harsh criminal punishments common when the Eighth Amendment was
adopted may so starkly clash with contemporary sensibilities that we are
led astray from the original public meaning of “cruel” or “unusual.”125
Casting the interpreter’s horizon as an epistemological obstacle to
accessing fixed textual meaning in the past enables Solum to distinguish
the purported fact of the original public meaning from the interpreter’s
beliefs about that fact: “our understanding of original meaning (as
opposed to the original meaning itself) is always subject to change.”126
This distinction, in turn, enables an asymptotic fusion of horizons: The
progressive accretion of information about original meaning illuminates
textual interpretations that more closely approximate the fixed original
public meaning.127 The interpreter’s horizon approaches the horizon of
the constitutional text ever more closely, but it is only ever the
interpreter’s horizon that moves—the textual horizon remains fixed,
anchored in place by the semantics and context existing at adoption.128
This enables Solum to conclude that “nothing in Gadamer’s
hermeneutics . . . undermines the fixation thesis.”129
*

*

*

Whittington and Solum read the horizonal metaphor in the same way
despite their contrasting goals, as an illustration of epistemological
obstacles to interpretation. Gadamer, by contrast, deployed the metaphor
to show something quite different.
contemporary one, then it is admitted in principle that he can break out of his
own perspective.
Cf. HIRSCH, supra note 55, app. II at 254.
123. “[A] hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us. They
constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, for they represent that beyond which it is
impossible to see.” Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 147 (alteration
in original) (quoting GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 316). This passage is quoted
out of context. See infra Section III.A.2.b.
124. Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 148.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 148–49 (“The fact that our knowledge of original meaning is imperfect does not
entail that there is no original meaning.”). As will become clear, this distinction is crucial to
Solum’s purported reconciliation of public-meaning originalism with Brown v. Board of
Education. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
127. Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 148.
128. See supra Part I.
129. Solum, Hermeneutics & the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 149.
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2. Phenomenological Expansion
These epistemological readings of “horizon” suggest that the present
horizon swallows the past, as Whittington feared, or the past horizon
(eventually) swallows the present, as Solum concluded. The fusing of
past and present horizons, however, illustrates Gadamer’s ontology of
understanding: how textual meaning comes into being from the
contributions of both past and present.
a. Phenomenological Horizons. Gadamer drew the horizonal
metaphor from the founder of the phenomenological movement, Edmund
Husserl.130 Husserl noted that when we directly observe an object in
three-dimensional space, we can literally see only a part of it at any one
time.131 Nevertheless, our mental perception is of the entire object, not
just the part observed directly.132 We always perceive more than is
directly given to our senses.133 Standing on the street, we see only the
front side of a house, not its back. We can move around to the back, but
this will preclude us from directly observing the front. Still, our
perception is of an entire house, not merely the side we observe directly.
How can this be? Our experience of houses and the contexts in which
they normally appear fills out what is missing from direct observation,134
enabling mental perception of the entire house though only a part is
directly visible. So in a residential neighborhood, we would be shocked
130. See EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY § 33 at 65–66, § 52 at 117–18 (F. Kersten trans., 1982) (1913).
See generally KENNY, supra note 11, at 817.
131. HUSSERL, supra note 130, § 44 at 94–95.
132. See Henry Pietersma, Intuition and Horizon in the Philosophy of Husserl, 34 PHIL. &
PHENOMEN. RES. 95, 99, 100 (1973):
In perceiving a material object the subject does not see the object all at once. Yet
Husserl insists that a perceptual situation is a case of seeing the object
itself . . . . Since the perceptual object is an external object of a material
sort . . . the subject is also aware that there is more to the object than what he
actually perceives.
133. See David Vessey, Gadamer and the Fusion of Horizons, 17 INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 531,
533 (2009). Heidegger calls this the “as” structure of interpretation: we always interpret
something as something else, within the web of relevant relations that constitute our world.
HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 59, at 189; see HEIDEGGER, METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 60, at 127–28. A train whistle, for example, is usually perceived as a train, not as a
sound simpliciter. Indeed, it requires extraordinary mental effort to hear a train whistle and not
perceive the train emitting it.
134. See HUSSERL, supra note 130, § 113, at 267 (“Every perception has . . . its background
of perception.”); see also EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS 44 (Dorian Cairns trans.,
1973) (“[P]erception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that
we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we
turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth.”
(emphasis omitted)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/2

26

Gedicks: The "Fixation Thesis" and Other Falsehoods

2020]

THE “FIXATION THESIS” AND OTHER FALSEHOODS

245

to walk behind a house to discover that the front side is a mere façade,
even though from the front we cannot see the back. But on a Hollywood
backlot, we’d be shocked to find a whole house behind (what we would
assume from experience is) a mere façade, again without ever having
actually seen more than the front. Our knowledge and experience of
houses and façades and the contexts in which they normally appear fills
in our perception in both cases, even though we cannot ever directly
observe the entirety of either all at once. The sum of these experiences
and contexts is the “horizon” of the house or the façade.135
A Husserlian horizon, therefore, enlarges understanding. It includes
all possible experiences of an object, not just those given to the senses
from one particular time and place. It expands the limits of sensory
perception.
b. Ontology of Meaning. Gadamer expressly adopts the Husserlian
concept of horizon, adapting it from mental perception to textual
interpretation.136 Neither the interpreter’s nor the text’s horizon
represents an epistemological limit to understanding.137 While a present
135. See Vessey, supra note 133, at 534 (“Those aspects of an object that are not directly
accessible to our senses, but make it possible to see an object as an object, Husserl call[s] the
object’s ‘horizon.’” (quoting HUSSERL, supra note 130, §§ 27, 44)).
136. E.g., GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 247 (“[T]he concept and
phenomenon of the horizon is of crucial importance for Husserl’s phenomenological research.
With this concept, which we too shall have occasion to use, Husserl is obviously seeking to
capture the way all limited intentionality of meaning merges into the fundamental continuity of
the whole.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 464 & n.83 (“Seen phenomenologically, the ‘thing-initself’ is, as Husserl has shown, nothing but the continuity with which the various perceptual
perspectives on objects shade into one another.” (footnote omitted) (quoting HUSSERL, supra note
130, § 41)); see also Walter Lammi, Gadamer’s Debt to Husserl, in 71 ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA:
THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 167, 176 (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka ed.,
2001) (observing that Gadamer understands “horizon” in terms of Husserl’s phenomenology).
137. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 247 (“A horizon is not a rigid
boundary but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further.”); id. at 313
(footnote omitted):
Since Nietzsche and Husserl, the word [“horizon”] has been used in philosophy
to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the
way one’s range of vision is gradually expanded. A person who has no horizon
does not see far enough and hence over-values what is nearest to him. On the
other hand, “to have a horizon” means not being limited to what is nearby but
being able to see beyond it.
See also RICOEUR, supra note 33, at 73 (“[A]ccording to Gadamer . . . the finite condition of
historical knowledge . . . does not enclose me in one point of view. Wherever there is a situation,
there is a horizon that can be contracted or enlarged.”); Dermot Moran, Gadamer and Husserl on
Horizon, Intentionality, Intersubjectivity, and the Life-World, in 2 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN
HERMENEUTICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY 73, 84 (Andrzej Wierciński ed., 2011) (“Gadamer opposes
the view that horizons are mutually exclusive or that world views are hermetically sealed and
nonporous. . . . Horizons are not just limits but are essentially open to other horizons; they are
moving boundaries.”).
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horizon dictates conventional understandings of texts from the past, the
interpreter is always aware—or can be made aware—that there exist other
horizons incorporating alternate understandings of these texts.138
We “fuse” horizons by thinking two things together: the alterity of
textual meaning from the past that has brought us “up short,”139 in concert
with our present expectations of this meaning.140 It is because the text
“makes a claim on us” that we are spurred to try to understand it
differently than unreflective conventions in the present would suggest.141
The interpreter in her present horizon imaginatively projects herself into
the past horizon of the text.142 This does not mean objectifying the past,
as if one were an uninvolved subject observing it from the outside.143 This
would put nothing of the interpreter at risk, foreclosing that the text can
be a claim on her.144 We are not horizonal tourists who visit the text like
a theme park before returning safely home. Nor is this fusion a loss of
oneself in the past (a Romantic delusion).145 It is precisely oneself whom
one must project into the past horizon;146 only then does the interpreter
place in question her expectations of meaning.147 With the interpreter’s
preconceptions at risk within the horizon of the text, she is in a position
to consider if what the text is saying “could be right.”148
With the proper understanding of “horizon,” the horizonal submersion
feared by Whittington is not an interpretive possibility. A text can make
new claims on the interpreter that she can understand because she can
138. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 315; see also Mootz, Legal
Hermeneutics, supra note 29, at 535; Vessey, supra note 133, at 533, 536, 540.
139. See supra text accompanying note 110.
140. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 317 (noting the “tension between
the text and the present”).
141. Id. app. at 522–23.
142. Id. at 315–16.
143. Id. at 312, 320.
144. See id. at 314, app. at 522–23.
145. See id. at 315; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 143 (“[T]he idea that we can escape
our own standpoint and leap into the horizon of the past . . . is not the right answer. . . . [W]e are
always ontologically grounded in our situation and horizon.”).
146. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 315.
147.
[W]e cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the thing if we want to
understand the meaning of another. . . . [W]e remain open to the meaning of the
other person or text. But this openness always includes our situating the other
meaning in relation to the whole of our meanings or ourselves in relation to it.
Id. at 281.
148. Id. at 303; see also id. at 458 (“[T]he other world we encounter is not only foreign but
is also related to us. It has not only its own truth in itself but also its own truth for us.”); id. at 504
(“Understanding . . . does not consist in a technical virtuosity of ‘understanding’ everything
written. Rather, it is a genuine experience—i.e., an encounter with something that asserts itself as
truth.” (citation omitted)).
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always be made aware of the past horizon of the text despite its difference
from her own; the text is never “submerged” in the interpreter’s horizon,
as Whittington claims.149 As Francis Mootz explains, the “text stands as
a provocation that cannot be wholly subordinated by the reader’s
perspective.”150
Likewise, the interpreter’s horizon is not an epistemological obstacle
to textual meaning fixed in the past,151 as Solum argued.152 Meaning
occurs from fusion of both horizons—interpreter and text, present and
past. Fusion excludes the possibility of Solum’s distinction between
beliefs and facts about original meaning, and thus also his conclusion that
the fixation thesis coheres with philosophical hermeneutics.
B. “Application”
The conceptual heart of Truth and Method is a section titled “The
recovery of the fundamental hermeneutic problem,” referring to both the
historical disappearance of application from the process of textual
understanding and the philosophical problem created by its restoration to
that process.153 Whittington and (for the most part) Solum again read
Gadamer epistemologically rather than ontologically.154 They insist that
application is a procedure divorced from interpretation: one first
discovers the original public meaning of the Constitution, and only
thereafter applies it to a particular case or problem. This is the very
conceptual error Gadamer is at pains to correct: application combines
with interpretation in a single event of understanding; it is not a separate
and subsequent procedure. Textual meaning does not exist apart from
textual application: one understands a text in its application, not beforehand.
1. Interpretive Exclusion
The biblical hermeneutics that emerged from the Reformation
recognized understanding, interpretation, and application as three
separate modes of textual comprehension.155 The Romantics combined
understanding and interpretation, believing interpretation necessary for

149. See supra Section II.A.1.a.
150. Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 29, at 161.
151. Cf. Ian Crosby, Note, Worlds in Stone: Gadamer, Heidegger, and Originalism, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 849, 853 (1998) (explaining that philosophical hermeneutics rejects that interpretation
approaches the “author’s understanding as to a limit”).
152. See supra Section II.A.1.b.
153. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 318–50.
154. See supra Section III.A.1.
155. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 318.
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correct understanding.156 This left application an interpretive
afterthought, a belated procedure placed elsewhere and after
understanding/interpretation.157
Gadamer
melds
application
to
the
Romantic
unity
understanding/interpretation so as to combine understanding/
interpretation/application into a single event of textual comprehension:
[U]nderstanding always involves something like applying
the text to be understood to the interpreter’s present
situation. Thus we are forced to go one step beyond romantic
hermeneutics, as it were, by regarding not only
understanding and interpretation, but also application as
comprising one unified process. . . . [W]e consider
application to be just as integral a part of the hermeneutical
process as are understanding and interpretation.158
In the Romantic sense of application, a person takes a principle and
deploys it to a particular situation involving someone or something else—
i.e., to a situation the interpreter is figuratively standing “outside of.” By
contrast, a Gadamerian interpreter is always interpreting herself along
with the text, because no interpretation is free of the interpreter’s horizon.
This is the effect of history, what it means for textual meaning to be
constituted by present as well as past. Every interpreter is standing within
the interpretive situation; when she applies the text from within that
situation, she applies it to herself.159 As we saw, when Judge Bork
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause in light of Brown, he could not
avoid also interpreting himself and public-meaning originalism.160

156. See id.; see also id. at 185–86 (summarizing Schleiermacher’s argument that the normal
consequence of textual understanding is misunderstanding, which can be corrected only by
interpretation).
157. See, e.g., id. at 318 (“The inner fusion of understanding and interpretation led to the
third element in the hermeneutical problem, application, becoming wholly excluded from any
connection with hermeneutics. The edifying application of Scripture in Christian preaching, for
example, now seemed very different from the historical and theological understanding of it.”
(emphasis omitted)).
158. Id. at 318–19 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 416; see also GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 30, at 55 (“In the last analysis,
all understanding is self-understanding . . . .”).
160. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
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A text is understandable only through its applications because its
meaning is those applications.161 Gadamer could hardly be clearer:
“Understanding here is always application.”162
2. Interpretive Unity
Having committed himself to the unity understanding–interpretation–
application, Gadamer moves to the philosophical problem this unity
creates: we can “apply” only something we already possess, so it seems
we cannot possess textual meaning before the application that codetermines that meaning.163 Gadamer turns to two sources to illustrate
this problem and its solution: Aristotle’s account of moral knowledge,164
and the similarity of legal to historical interpretation.165 In both ethical
and legal decision-making, he concludes, one already possesses what she
applies in understanding–interpretation–application, because she is
applying herself from within the ethical or legal interpretive situation as
a co-determinant of meaning.
a. Aristotelian Ethics. Gadamer reads the Ethics to show that we are
not subjects related to moral knowledge as an object, as if it were a skill
or set of rules we first learn and then apply.166 Aristotle emphasizes the
importance of the moral agent’s particularity to ethical decision-making.
How to act rightly in a situation depends on the actor’s experience of prior
situations and the character she developed by acting in those situations.167
Education is important, but less for the knowledge it imparts than for the
161. See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 321–22 (“The meaning of a
law that emerges in its normative application is fundamentally no different from the meaning
reached in understanding a text.”); id. at 338 (“The work of interpretation is to concretize the law
in each specific case—i.e., it is a work of application.” (footnote omitted)).
162. Id. at 320; see also id. at xxix (“[A]pplication is an element of understanding itself.”);
id. at 321 (“[D]iscovering the meaning of a legal text and discovering how to apply it in a
particular legal instance are not two separate actions, but one unitary process.”); id. at 421
(“[U]nderstanding always includes an element of application . . . .”).
163. See id. at 321.
164. Id. at 322–33 (discussing ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics (W.D. Ross trans.)
[hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Ethics], in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 11, at 927, 935–
1112 i-x 1094a1-1181b25.).
165. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 334–39.
166. See id. at 327.
167. ARISTOTLE, Ethics, supra note 164, at 952 ii.1 1103a16-17, 953 1103b14-17:
[M]oral virtue comes about as the result of habit . . . . [B]y doing the acts that we
do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the
acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or
confidence, we become brave or cowardly.”); see also id. at 953 (“[W]e must
examine the nature of actions . . . for these determine also the nature of the states
of character that are produced . . . .”).
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character it develops.168 Who we are determines what we can understand
of a situation calling for action, and what we understand of such a
situation determines how we will act in it.169 The particularities of the
situation also play a part. “What is right . . . cannot be fully determined
independently of the situation that requires a right action from
me . . . .”170 Because of the dependence of moral knowledge on the
particularities of agent and situation, one cannot acquire moral
knowledge by learning rules.171
Gadamer analogizes the process of ascertaining textual meaning to
ethical decision-making, formalizing it with an exegesis of Book VI of
the Ethics.172 There, Aristotle famously defined and contrasted the
intellectual virtues, including scientific knowledge (epistēmē), craft or
skill (technē), and practical wisdom (phronēsis).173 Gadamer is keen to
show that practical wisdom is the model of understanding for the human
sciences. In acquiring scientific knowledge, the observing subject is
separated from the object of knowledge, and in using a craft or skill the
subject is distinct from the object she makes; in exercising practical
wisdom, however, the agent is defined and constituted precisely by her
choices and actions.174 Scientific and technical knowledge always
involve something like the application of an a priori rule to a separate and
subsequent situation, whereas practical wisdom emerges only in the
actions chosen within particular situations.175

168. See id. at 936 i.3 1094b28-1095a2, 937 i.4 1095b3; see also id. at 937–38 i.4 1095b6-8
(“For the fact is the starting-point . . . and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily
get starting-points.”).
169. Carl Page, Hermeneutics and Practical Rationality, 27 INT’L PHIL. Q. 81, 93 (1987).
170. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 327–28; see also id. at 323 (“If man
always encounters the good in the form of the particular practical situation in which he finds
himself, the task of moral knowledge is to determine what the concrete situation asks of
him . . . .”).
171. See ARISTOTLE, Ethics, supra note 164, at 953 ii.2 1104a4-5 (“[M]atters concerned with
conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity . . . .”).
172. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 324–33.
173. See Aristotle, Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 11, at 1022–36
vi 1138b13-34a14.
174. JAMES RISSER, HERMENEUTICS AND THE VOICE OF THE OTHER: RE-READING GADAMER’S
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 106 (1997); Paul Schuchman, Aristotle’s Phronēsis and
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 23 PHIL. TODAY 41, 43–44 (1979).
175. See ARISTOTLE, Ethics, supra note 164, at 1033 vi.9 1143a32-35 (“[N]ot only must the
man of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding and judgement are also
concerned with things to be done . . . .”); see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 147 (“In ethical
know-how there can be no prior knowledge of the right means by which we realize the end in a
particular situation.”); Catherine H. Zuckert, Hermeneutics in Practice: Gadamer on Ancient
Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GADAMER 201, 212 (Robert J. Dostal ed., 2002):
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Gadamer concludes that the Ethics models the problem of application,
and its solution, in three ways. First, the moral agent’s understanding of
what an ethical situation demands of her is not the later application of a
predetermined good, but co-determines the good from the beginning.176
This parallels Gadamer’s hermeneutic thesis that textual understanding is
always application—the character of the textual interpreter and the
occasion and motivation for her interpretation necessarily contribute to
the meaning of the text.177
Second, because the good of an action is partially constituted by its
applications, it cannot be predetermined as an abstract rule, but must
respond directly to the demands of the situation.178 Similarly, the meaning
of a text cannot first be established in the abstract and then applied to a
particular interpretive problem; rather, interpretation, application, and
understanding occur simultaneously in a single event.179
Finally, because a good action depends on both the demands of the
situation and the character of the agent, the agent must not ignore her own
particularity, which is the only way she can understand what the situation
ethically requires of her.180 Likewise, because we have no access to an
“objective” understanding of a text, we can understand the text only in
the traditional context in which it has been handed down, as the people
we already are with the preconceptions we already have.181
In short, just as moral knowledge arises from the character of the agent
and the situation calling her to act, textual meaning is a function of the
interpreter in the present and the text from the past. In neither case can
rules govern the crucial event of ethical decision or textual understanding.
b. Legal Interpretation. The Romantics excluded legal interpretation
from the general hermeneutics of the human sciences because of its
Knowledge of the good is not like other forms of knowledge; it does not consist
of generalizations from empirical data or experiences, nor does it constitute the
application of general rules to particular situations, nor it is [sic] deductive like
geometry . . . . It does not . . . involve cognition of an abstract or self-subsisting
“idea” of the kind Aristotle criticizes in his works on ethics.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 330.
See id. at 333.
Id. at 330–32.
See id. at 324, 333.
Id. at 332–33.
See id. at 333; see also id. at 324:
We spoke of the interpreter’s belonging to the tradition he is interpreting, and we
saw that understanding itself is a historical event. The alienation of the interpreter
from the interpreted by the objectifying methods of modern science,
characteristic of the hermeneutics and historiography of the nineteenth century,
appeared as the consequence of a false objectification.
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“dogmatic” requirement that cases be decided in conformity to law.182
“Dogma” here means something more and different than pre-ordained
meaning; it has the sense of a norm “in force.”183 Legal interpretation
always proceeds on the assumption that there exists valid law applicable
to the interpretive situation.184 To decide a case, the judge must always
ascertain the law in force.
The Romantics understood history as a science governed by the
general hermeneutics of method, like the natural sciences.185 The judge
thus seemed more constrained than the legal historian, in that the judge
was dogmatically bound to decide cases in accordance with the law,
whereas the historian was free to deal with law on the basis of its
historical significance alone.186 Gadamer rejects this distinction, arguing
that the dogmatic purpose of legal interpretation actually makes it the
model for all of the human sciences.187 All interpretation dogmatically
assumes a norm in force, a live preconception that precedes and
contributes to textual meaning.
Gadamer first argues that neither law nor history reconstructs and
applies original meaning alone.188 The historian cannot understand a
law’s historical significance unless she assembles all of its applications
over the course of its existence:
It is only in all its applications that the law becomes concrete.
Thus the legal historian cannot be content to take the original
application of the law as determining its original meaning.
As a historian he will, rather, have to take account of the
historical change that the law has undergone. In
understanding, he will have to mediate between the original
application and the present application of the law.189
For example, a legal historian cannot understand the Fourteenth
Amendment by focusing on its original meaning upon ratification in
1868. She must also understand all of the Court’s applications of the
Amendment down to the present, including Brown, before she can truly
understand it historically. And yet, it is impossible for a legal historian to

182. See id. at 334, 337.
183. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 55, at 192.
184. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 319; WEINSHEIMER, supra note 55,
at 194 (“In an application that sets precedent, the judge determines the law, not just what it was
but what it is and will be. He revises the law, not by enacting a new law, but precisely in
understanding the law already in force.”).
185. Cf. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 334.
186. See id. at 334.
187. Id. at 337.
188. See id. at 335–37.
189. Id. at 335.
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do this as if she were unaware of and not influenced by Brown’s
canonization, which is the norm in force.
Nor does the judge merely apply original meaning to resolve her
cases.190 One must distinguish the original meaning from the meaning
applied in current practice because the judge determines what the law
means at the time she applies it to the case before her.191 Though she must
start with original meaning, she is not bound by it—or rather, only by
it.192 She must “take account of the change in circumstances and hence
define afresh the normative function of the law.”193 For example, the
Court in Brown held the original understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause irrelevant,194 relying instead on decisions decided since
ratification, especially those in the immediately preceding years.195
The “hermeneutical situation” of judge and historian, therefore, is the
same: seeking to understand a law, they each have an immediate
expectation of meaning—that is, some interpretive preconception. Each
must account for the change in circumstances between the law’s origin
and its present, which requires knowledge of both the meaning of the text
in the past and its permutations through time into the present. As
Gadamer sums up,
The historian has to undertake the same reflection as
the jurist. . . . Historical knowledge can be gained only by
seeing the past in its continuity with the present—which
is exactly what the jurist does in his practical, normative
work of “ensuring the unbroken continuance of law and
preserving the tradition of the legal idea.” 196
From here, Gadamer argues that legal interpretation represents the
precise relationship between past and present that exists in all of the

190. See id. at 336.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 126 (“[T]he correct
interpretation of a law is presupposed in its application.”).
194. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 640, 642 (1950) (AfricanAmerican graduate student admitted to university could not be made to sit in segregated portions
of classrooms, library, or cafeteria); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632, 635–36 (1950) (Newly
established state law school for African-Americans could not provide legal education equal to that
provided by the segregated University of Texas law school).
196. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 336 (quoting EMILIO BETTI, ZUR
GRUNDLEGUNG EINER ALLGEMEINEN AUSLEGUNGSLEHRE 91 n.62a (1988)); see also GADAMER,
TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, supp. I at 532–35 (discussing and criticizing Betti’s
hermeneutic position as rooted in the discredited Romantic quest for objective interpretive
method). The essentials of Betti’s hermeneutics are set forth in English in Betti, Hermeneutics,
supra note 55.
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human sciences.197 To “understand” and to “interpret” mean to apply a
norm in force in a legal or historical controversy. Application of this norm
connects the origins of the law as they have been handed down in legal
tradition with the present understanding of the law.198 The judge is of
course concerned with legal rather than historical significance.199 Though
the judge is not a historian, she must be conscious of the history of the
law, how it has come to be understood in the present.200 Asking, “How
did the law arrive at its current state?” is the same as asking, “What is the
current law?”
While the legal historian need not use current law to resolve a
particular case, neither can she disregard it.201 A person trying to
understand the law from its origin cannot ignore its continuing effect as
it has moved through time.202 But this is true of any text—it always needs
to be restated in terms of the present.203 Historical understanding is the
mediation of past and present, the fusion of the horizon of the text with
the horizon of the interpreter,204 just as is legal understanding.205

197. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 337.
198. See GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 82 (“Finding the law means thinking
the case together with the law so that what is actually just or the law gets concretized.”);
GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 337 (“The judge seeks to be in accord with the
‘legal idea’ in mediating it with the present.”).
199. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 337.
200. Id. (“[The judge’s] orientation is not that of a historian, but he has an orientation to his
own history, which is his present.”).
201. Id.
202. Cf. id. (“[The law] presents [the historian] with the questions that he has to ask of
historical tradition.”).
203. Id. at 337–38 (“Inasmuch as the actual object of historical understanding is not events
but their ‘significance,’ it is clearly an incorrect description of this understanding [i.e., of the text
in terms of the present] to speak of an object existing in itself and of the subject’s approach to
it.”); id. at 338 (“[H]istorical understanding always implies that the tradition reaching us speaks
into the present and must be understood in this mediation—indeed as this mediation.”).
204. See infra Section III.B.3.
205. Gadamer’s discussion here suggests something like the Madisonian “liquidation” of
meaning, whereby the vague, ambiguous, or otherwise uncertain meaning of constitutional
provisions is specified by custom and usage over the course of time, rather than by semantic
meaning and historical context at the time of adoption. See, e.g., William Baude, Constitutional
Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). Liquidation’s sense of the evolution and eventual
coalescence of textual meaning over time resonates with Gadamer’s idea that a crucial component
of historical and legal interpretation is understanding how the law has come down to the present
with the meaning it now has. For Gadamer, however, textual meaning is never finally and fully
liquidated. Cf. id. at 13–21 (arguing that liquidation occurs when a course of historical practice
specifies a consistent meaning for an indeterminate constitutional text, which comes to be
generally accepted). Because textual meaning is always constituted by the present as well as the
past, it is never final, always subject to alteration at the next application.
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Truth and Method calls on Aristotelian ethics and legal decisionmaking to show that textual meaning is created by the application of
oneself within an interpretive situation. Application co-determines one’s
understanding of both an ethical situation and a text from the past. Just as
application does not consist in applying some pregiven ethical rule to an
objectified situation, so also the interpreter of a text does not take the text
as a universal that she first understands abstractly and only afterwards
applies to particular situations.206 And just as an ethical decision is a
constituent of the moral agent’s character, so also the interpreter
understands the text through its application to herself and her situation.207
Legal interpretation models the general hermeneutics of the human
sciences in a similar way.208 To properly decide a case, the judge must
mediate the original meaning and the concerns of the present in an
application that reflects on her as well as her case. But this is what
application means in all of the human sciences; all interpretive activity
requires an awareness of the effect of history, of how applications of a
text through time alter both the text’s original meaning and the
interpreter’s understanding of herself in relation to the text.209
3. Epistemological Application
Professors Whittington and Solum each reject the unity
understanding/interpretation/application, arguing that the application of
textual meaning is separate from and subsequent to the textual
interpretation that yields the meaning to be applied.
a. Whittington. Whittington asserts that understanding–interpretation–
application contradicts the “everyday experience of interpreting texts”:
Quite often . . . we must formulate and understand a general
principle before specific applications can be considered, let
alone resolved. . . . Our understandings are not set, in the
sense of being unrevisable in the face of error, but neither
are they essentially tied to applications such that every
206. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 333; see also Leiter, supra note 57, at
280–81 (“There is much in human judgment and action that is possible only because of practical
skills and competence that remain beyond the reach of theoretical articulation.”).
207. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 333; see also Mootz, Originalist
Fixation, supra note 29, at 166 (“All historical understanding is a play of objectivity and
subjectivity.”).
208. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 334.
209. See id. at 349–50 (“When a judge regards himself as entitled to supplement the original
meaning of the text of a law, he is doing exactly what takes place in all other
understanding. . . . [H]istorically effected consciousness is at work in all hermeneutical
activity . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
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application results in a new, equally valid, and potentially
contradictory understanding.210
Specific applications change over time, he allows, but the general
principle one applies does not.211
b. Solum. To grasp Solum’s argument, one must understand the
meaning he ascribes to constitutional “construction.” Like most publicmeaning originalists,212 Solum divides the process of ascertaining
constitutional meaning into empirical and normative components. 213 As
we have seen, constitutional “interpretation” is the empirical discovery
of fixed original public meaning.214 Public-meaning “construction,” by
contrast, is the normative process of applying the fixed original
constitutional meaning to create doctrine and resolve cases.215
With the interpretation–construction distinction in mind, Solum
quotes two paragraphs from Truth and Method from which he constructs
a syllogism purporting to demonstrate that philosophical hermeneutics is
compatible with the fixation thesis: 216
210. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 104. The value of critical analysis, of
course, is precisely its challenge to naïve or unreflective experience, whose immediacy so often
leads us astray. See Stephen M. Feldman, How to Be Critical, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893–94
(2000).
211. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 104.
212. But see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 752–53 (rejecting constitutional
“construction”).
213. See Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 134.
214. See supra Part I.
215. WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 48, at 5–6; Solum, Hermeneutics and the
Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 134–35; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 457 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Originalism &
Construction].
Statutory “construction” has long been a part of legal interpretation, but its application to the
Constitution was theorized only recently, primarily in the early work of Professor Whittington.
See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 6–7; WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra
note 48, at 5–7.
Because construction is a normative process that projects meaning onto the text, Whittington
considers it fundamentally incompatible with the judicial role of merely interpreting the
Constitution. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 5–6. He thus confines construction
to the political branches. WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 48, at 6–8; WHITTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 7. Later theorists, however—including most public-meaning
originalists—have embraced construction as a necessary and legitimate part of judicial decisionmaking in constitutional disputes. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 300–12
(2011); BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 121–30; Solum, Originalism &
Construction, supra.
216.
It is true that the jurist is always concerned with the law itself, but he determines
its normative content in regard to the given case to which it is applied. In order
to determine this content exactly, it is necessary to have historical knowledge of
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1. The translators of Truth and Method used “interpretation”
to signify “construction,” which by definition includes
application of law to decide individual cases.217
2. This substitution of “construction” for “interpretation”
makes clear that Truth and Method distinguishes “interpretation”
from “construction.”218
a. Philosophical hermeneutics entails discovery of
original textual meaning by an act of interpretation,219 and
then
b. Application of discovered meaning to particular
cases by an act of construction.220

the original meaning, and only for this reason does the judge concern himself
with the historical value that the law has through the act of legislation. But he
cannot let himself be bound by what, say, an account of the parliamentary
proceedings tells him about the intentions of those who first passed the law.
Rather, he has to take account of the change in circumstances and hence define
afresh the normative function of the law. . . .
The work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific case—i.e., it
is a work of application. The creative supplementing of the law that is involved
is a task reserved to the judge, but he is subject to the law in the same way as is
every other member of the community. It is part of the idea of a rule of law that
the judge’s judgment does not proceed from an arbitrary and unpredictable
decision, but from the just weighing up of the whole. Anyone who has immersed
himself in the particular situation is capable of undertaking this just weighing up.
That is why in a state governed by law, there is legal certainty—i.e., it is in
principle possible to know what the exact situation is. Every lawyer and every
counsel is able, in principle, to give correct advice—i.e., he can accurately
predict the judge’s decision on the basis of existing laws.
Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 146 (citation omitted) (quoting
GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 336, 338–39).
217. See id. (“Notice that the English word used by the translators, ‘interpretation,’ is used
to express the concept that I have represented by the word ‘construction.’”).
218. See id. (“Gadamer’s text seems to presuppose the interpretation-construction distinction
as a conceptual matter . . . .”).
219. See id. at 147 (“[Gadamer’s] account of interpretation (in the sense stipulated here)
focuses on original meaning . . . .”).
220. See id. at 146–47 (“[Gadamer] clearly distinguishes between the recovery of original
meaning (‘interpretation’) and the application of the text to a particular case (‘construction’).”).
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3. The fixation thesis is presupposed by acts
interpretation, but unaffected by acts of construction.221

of

Therefore, the hermeneutics of Truth and Method is compatible
with the fixation thesis.222
4. Ontological Application
Professors Whittington and Solum both contend that “application” is
the deployment of a pre-existing abstract legal principle to a subsequent
concrete case. This directly conflicts with the claim of Truth and Method
that legal and other principles are defined in the act of application, not
before.
a. Ontological Conflict. Whittington’s and Solum’s accounts of
application presupposes the strict subject–object dualism of Cartesian
ontology, under which the object of knowledge—e.g., the fixed meaning
of the text in the past—exists independently of the knowing subject—the
interpreter in the present.223 This ontological presupposition is essential
to public-meaning originalism’s epistemological claim that, if properly
followed, public-meaning method discovers the “objective” meaning of
the Constitution—its original public meaning.224 It is also a critical
component of the claim that one can discover a legal principle prior to
applying it, for this is possible only if the principle exists apart from its
application.
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the subject–object dualism.225
Hermeneutics presupposes a competing ontology, according to which the
knowing subject and the object of knowledge are always already
entangled with each other.226 The meaning of the Constitution, therefore,
is constituted by both subject and object, interpreter and text, present and
past. This obviously precludes the possibility that constitutional meaning
exists in the past as a fact, independently of the present. It also dictates a
particular meaning of “application,” according to which legal principles
are defined concretely in the act of application, not as a priori
abstractions.227
221. See id. at 142 (“The fixation thesis is a [claim] about constitutional interpretation; it is
not a claim about constitutional construction.”).
222. See id. at 147 (“[I]t would seem that [Gadamer] accepts the fixation thesis.”).
223. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
224. Cf. Bliss, supra note 60, at 408 (“The object, existing external to and independent of
subjects, may appear to any subject that is so qualified and so related as to apprehend it. It is not
the exclusive property of one subject, but may be apprehended by any normal subject. Your
perception will lead you to apprehend the very things . . . which my perceptions discern . . . . We
therefore infer and believe that we both perceive the same objects . . . .”).
225. See supra Section III.B.4.
226. See supra Section II.A.
227. See supra Part III.
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Which ontology enables the correct account of textual meaning:
subject–object dualism, under which meaning is a self-existent fact in the
past, or the subject–object entanglement of being-in-the-world, whereby
meaning is the mutual constituent of past and present? Epistemology
cannot answer this. All epistemologies presuppose an ontology; any
epistemology that purports to prove an ontology, therefore, begs the
ontological question. The best one can do is to examine carefully each
account and offer observations about which is more plausible, more
closely coheres with our experience of understanding texts. I take this up
in Part IV.
b. Hermeneutics and Fixation. Solum rejects the ontology of Truth
and Method derived from human being-in-the-world.228 By substituting
the subject–object distinction of Cartesian ontology, however, he
trivializes his conclusion. It should be obvious that replacing the ontology
on which Gadamer’s argument is founded with the ontology presupposed
by the fixation thesis does not demonstrate either the soundness of
fixation or its compatibility with Truth and Method. Solum’s argument
for the compatibility of fixation and philosophical hermeneutics fails.
Each premise of his argument is wrong. 229
First, Solum provides no justification for reading the new-originalist
definition of “construction” into “interpretation” in a single sentence of
Truth and Method.230 “Interpretation” is the standard translation of the
German Auslegen, used throughout Truth and Method, Being and Time,
and other German works on hermeneutics.231 If anything, Solum should
read “interpretation” as “construction” everywhere in Truth and Method
228. Professor Solum advised me in email correspondence that he thinks Gadamer’s
ontology is clearly wrong. This would explain why he substituted a Cartesian ontology, and why
he calls his analysis of Truth and Method a “reconstruction” rather than an “exegesis.” Solum,
Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 147; see also id. (referring to Gadamer’s
account of interpretation “in the sense stipulated here”).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 216–22. Though it fails on its own terms, Solum’s
ontological substitution perhaps illustrates Gadamer’s thesis that textual meaning is created by a
fusion of the interpreter’s concerns in the present with the tradition of the text from the past.
Solum’s deep commitment to public-meaning originalism, and his awareness that Truth and
Method is among the most important works on textual interpretation in the twentieth century, see
supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text, might have prompted his effort to reconcile the
fixation thesis with the account of application in this celebrated text. In any event, readers may
judge for themselves which of our respective readings of Truth and Method is the more plausible.
230. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. Solum is presumably referring to the
appearance of “interpretation” in one of the paragraphs he quoted from Truth and Method at the
outset of his argument. See supra note 216 (quoting GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20,
at 338 (“The work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific case—i.e., it is a work
of application.”) (italics in original, underlining added)).).
231. The primary sense of Auslegen is “laying out” or “laying open,” see Auslegung and -en,
OXFORD GERMAN DICTIONARY, supra note 64, at 109, as in, for example, laying out one’s
possibilities of existence or a text’s possible of meaning, see supra text accompanying notes 70–
71.
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because, as Gadamer’s discussion of application shows, Gadamerian
interpretation always includes a normative component.232 Solum’s
conclusion, however, could not follow from this premise; it would not
leave “interpretation” anything to do because there would be no textual
meaning fixed in the past awaiting interpretive discovery.
Second, Solum’s suggestion that Truth and Method presupposes the
interpretation–construction distinction is not a plausible reading of
Gadamer’s discussion of application. 233 Gadamer writes that application
“concretize[s]” the law because he adheres to the Aristotelian view that
universals, such as laws, exist only in their exemplifications and not
abstractly as ideals.234 “It is only in all its applications that the law
becomes concrete,” as Gadamer puts it.235 The meaning of any law is not
a platonic abstraction, but the sum of its applications.236
Gadamer’s account does not separate the empirical function of
interpretation—what does the text mean?—from the normative function
of application—how should the text apply?—because, for Gadamer,
these are the same question.237 The application in the present of a text
from the past is precisely what yields textual meaning.238
As we have seen, Gadamer maintains that interpretation and
application combine in a single event of textual understanding.239 This is
clear from Gadamer’s arguments that understanding is always
interpretation is always application;240 his invocation of Aristotelian
ethics, which rejects rule-bound answers to moral questions;241 and his
232. See supra Section III.B.2; infra note 237 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
234. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609,
635 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 329).
See generally NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, ON UNIVERSALS: AN ESSAY IN ONTOLOGY 137–38, 183–
84 (1970) (referring to the Aristotelian view); A.D. Woozley, Universals, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY 194, 197–98 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (same).
235. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 335.
236. See id. at 322–23 (reading the Ethics to have liberated moral decision-making from
Platonic metaphysics); cf. id. at 323 (arguing that the principle of moral knowledge is doing the
right thing, not thinking it.).
237. Cf. Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 29, at 168 (noting that the “severe epistemic
challenges” posed by the interpretation–construction distinction suggest “the ontological
impossibility of conceptually separating the ‘meaning’ of a text and its significance for the reader
who seeks the meaning”).
The separability of interpretation and application is the very ground on which Gadamer
criticized Emilio Betti’s hermeneutics. Compare 2 BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE, supra note 55, § 54
at 802–04 (arguing for the separation of “cognitive” and “normative” interpretation) (author’s
translation), with GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, app. at 533–35 (disputing that the
cognitive and the normative are separated in understanding).
238. See supra Section III.A.2.
239. See supra Section II.B.
240. See supra Section III.B.2.
241. See supra Section III.B.2.a.
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designation of legal interpretation, in which the application of a law is a
necessary constituent of the law’s meaning, as the general model of
hermeneutics in the human sciences.242 Each of these discussions shows
that interpretive meaning emerges in application, not before it;
application is necessarily application by the interpreter of herself within
her interpretive situation, not application of an abstract principle to a
circumstance external and unrelated to her and her situation.243
Finally, Solum is wrong to read new-originalist significance into
Gadamer’s assignment to judges of the “creative” or normative function
of application.244 Gadamer emphasized the normative function in the
paragraphs Solum quoted because Gadamer wrote here to disabuse
historicists of their norm-free self-image—by showing that writing
history is as normative as deciding legal disputes—and not because he
was engaged in new-originalist construction.245
Without these premises—substitution of construction for
interpretation, conceptual separation of interpretation from application,
and exclusion of normative activity from interpretation—Solum’s
argument evaporates. Solum’s conclusion that Gadamerian hermeneutics
presupposes the fixation thesis reduces to a question-begging banality:
“interpretation” as defined by public-meaning originalists is compatible
with the fixation thesis. This tells us nothing about “interpretation” as
defined by Gadamer, whose unification of understanding, application,
and interpretation makes fixed textual meaning impossible.
IV. BAD EXAMPLES
Professors Whittington and Solum each give examples purporting to
illustrate the soundness of the fixation thesis against hermeneutic critique.
The examples actually accomplish the opposite: they illustrate that
philosophical hermeneutics provides a more plausible account of textual
meaning than the subject–object dualism on which fixation rests.
A. Art Restoration
After defending new originalism’s conceptual separation of
application from interpretation, Whittington sums up with this example:
[A]n originalist seeking to salvage a soiled painting would
gradually clear away smudges in order to see better the
original portrait beneath. As layers of dirt are removed and
the canvas and paints tested, details emerge to deepen our
242. See supra Section III.B.2.b.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 206–09.
244. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.
245. Solum acknowledged this but did not discuss its implications. See Solum, Hermeneutics
and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 145–46.
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perception of the figure who was always vaguely visible, and
occasionally false marks are removed to reveal the original
underneath. A Gadamerian interpreter, on the other hand,
would not be seeking to deepen our understanding of the
artist’s portrait by revealing details contained in the original.
Rather, he would seek to expand the artist’s vision for the
new audience, adding new details with fresh paint,
multiplying the portraits appearing on the canvas.246
The originalist restorationist is familiar. She works on the ontological
assumption that the original meaning of the painting lies under all those
layers of medieval varnish and grime. Once the painting is uncovered just
as the artist painted it, it will be seen and understood as it was at its
unveiling.
But Whittington’s hermeneutic restorationist is not even a good
caricature. A hermeneutic restorationist would not expand on the original
by using “fresh paint” to create a “different portrait.” To the contrary, she
would be just as concerned as the originalist to uncover the original
painting. “Reconstructing the conditions in which a work passed down to
us from the past was originally constituted is undoubtedly an important
aid to understanding it.”247 Whittington assumes that the original image
of the painting is identical to the meaning of the painting. Yet, how can
we know that the meaning of the restored work to us matches its meaning
to those present at its unveiling? No painting has self-declaring meaning,
even at its origin, let alone centuries later.248 We cannot even be certain
the restoration matches the “original.” Did the artist add extra varnish at
the end to tone down colors that looked too bright? Or did she paint with
extra boldness to ensure color and contrast even after the inevitable
accumulation of dust and dirt?249
Most crucially, the hermeneutic restorationist is not isolated from the
centuries-old tradition in which the painting is embedded nor the
imperatives of the present in which she lives. She would not imagine that
her understanding of the restored painting matches the meaning at its
246. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 105.
247. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 166; see also Frank S. Ravitch, The
Continued Relevance of Philosophical Hermeneutics in Legal Thought, in LEGAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 28, at 88, 91 (“[I]nterpretive methodologies . . . obfuscat[e] what is
really going on. It is not that interpretive methodology is useless, but rather that it does not do
what it purports to do—reach an objective meaning.”).
248. Cf. Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 29, at 160 (“[M]eaning is not a feature of a
world that exists separate from the interpreter.”).
249. These and related issues were raised by the controversial cleaning of Michelangelo’s
frescoes in the Sistine Chapel, which illustrates the ontological problematics of the “original”
even in art. See generally WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 219 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (1955)
(explaining the ontological problems associated with the “original” in art).
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unveiling, because she knows that who she is and the present in which
she lives also contribute to its meaning. Restoration of a painting does not
yield the original work or its original meaning. It constitutes a “second
creation, the reproduction of the original production.”250 No matter how
much we know about the painting and its era and the people in it, we
cannot see and understand the painting as they saw and understood it, but
only as we imagine they might have. We can fuse the painting’s horizon
with our own by projecting ourselves into its origin and subsequent
history, but it remains ourselves whom we project.
Consider a mythic event from Roman history, the rape of Lucretia. As
recounted by Livy, around 500 B.C.E. during the siege of a nearby city,
Sextus, a son of the Roman king, assaulted Lucretia, wife of another
prince, Collatinus, while a guest in her home.251 Lucretia swore
Collatinus and his friend, Brutus, to avenge her “lost . . . honour.”252 They
sought to comfort her, as “sick at heart” as she was, “by diverting the
blame from her who was forced to the doer of the wrong.”253 But Lucretia
would not be comforted; innocent though she was, she took a knife
“concealed beneath her dress” and “plunged it into her heart,” so that no
woman could use her plight to justify adulterous behavior. 254 In the
aftermath, Collatinus and Brutus raised an army in rebellion against the
king as revenge for his son’s crime. The people flocked to their banner,
for “[e]very man had his own complaint to make of the prince’s crime
and his violence.”255 They deposed the king and drove Sextus into exile,
where he was murdered by old enemies. Freed from tyranny, the people
chose Brutus and Collatinus prefects of a new Roman republic.
Scores of artists have painted this story, two common depictions being
Sextus threatening Lucretia in her bed with his drawn sword, and Lucretia
in the moment of her suicide.256 A public-meaning originalist would seek
to document how any such painting was understood at the time it was first
viewed by the public; this understanding would fix its meaning,
irrespective of anything that followed. Yet, it takes little imagination to
realize that a contemporary art historian will understand a Lucretian
painting differently than a nineteenth century Romantic. Both will differ
from the understanding of a rape survivor in the Victorian Era, whose
understanding will differ from that of a survivor in the contemporary
West. Women will understand it differently than men. While a
250. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 166.
251. 1 LIVY, HISTORY OF ROME 197–209 (B.O. Foster trans., 1919) (27–25 B.C.E.).
252. Id. at 203.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Lucretia, NAT’L GALLERY ART, https://www.nga.gov/collection/art-objectpage.83.html [https://perma.cc/2YAB-HAHU].
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contemporary rape survivor may understandably suffer from suicidal
depression, it is not because she fears that others will point to her assault
as excuse for infidelity. And all of these potential meanings will differ
dramatically from Livy’s political intention to justify the violence and
revolution by which the Roman republic was born.257
Is it plausible that the meaning of a Lucretian painting is fixed by the
public’s understanding at the time it was unveiled, and all subsequent
meanings simply “made up”? Vastly different understandings of any
painting do not come about because someone added “fresh paint.”258
They are the consequence of the joint constitution of artistic meaning by
the successive traditions through which the painting is handed down from
the past and successive interpreters located in different presents. 259 No
matter how clear a restored portrait, how faithful to the original, what one
sees in it will depend upon the historical situation from which one sees it.
Gadamer’s observation is indisputable: “[U]nderstanding art always
includes historical mediation.”260
Likewise with constitutional meaning. “The way the interpreter
belongs to his text is like the way the point from which we are to view a
picture belongs to its perspective.”261 The judge who decides a
constitutional case cannot jump over centuries of decisions interpreting
the Constitution as if they are not there (and never were), leaving her a
direct, fully transparent view of its original public meaning. She instead
builds a bridge from past to present by reconstructing the meaning of a
clause, not just at its origin, but at all points down to the present.262 Her
decision is thus historically informed, though not historically determined.
B. Historical Events
Professor Solum recognizes that philosophical hermeneutics might be
making ontological claims.263 He responds by seizing on a statement by
Professor Mootz, who has also criticized Solum’s position using
257. See generally MELISSA M. MATTHES, THE RAPE OF LUCRETIA AND THE FOUNDING OF
REPUBLICS: READINGS IN LIVY, MACHIAVELLI, AND ROUSSEAU ch. 2 (2000) (examining potential
differing meanings of the rape of Lucretia); Eleanor Glendinning, Reinventing Lucretia: Rape,
Suicide and Redemption from Classical Antiquity to the Medieval Era, 20 INT’L J. CLASSICAL
TRADITION 61 (2013) (examining how Lucretia’s rape has been represented across literature).
258. See supra text accompanying note 246 (quoting WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 1, at 105).
259. Cf. Mootz, Legal Hermeneutics, supra note 29, at 535–36, 537 (arguing similarly
regarding written text).
260. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 20, at 165.
261. Id. at 338.
262. Cf. Ravitch, supra note 247, at 90 (“[P]hilosophical hermeneutics seems especially
useful in the context of legal interpretation because of the potential time lag and cultural shifts
between the drafting of laws and their application to a variety of fact scenarios.”).
263. See Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 28, at 149.
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philosophical hermeneutics: “There are no objective facts about the past
existing independently of our inquiries; rather, history is our mode of
being; as finite beings who can never rise out of our historical
situation.”264 Solum accuses Mootz (and by extension Gadamer) of
claiming “there are no objective facts at all,” which he swiftly dispatches
as a reductio:
[T]his means that there is no fact of the matter about such
mundane and insignificant questions as whether this
paragraph was first composed on July 17, 2015. Nor could
there be an objective fact of the matter about the occurrence
of the Holocaust or indeed whether the Allied forces invaded
Normandy beginning on June 6, 1944.265
I take Mootz’s point, though I would have put it this way: the meaning
of the past is not an objective fact existing independently of our present
inquiries about this meaning. Solum acknowledges that Mootz might
have meant merely to distinguish facts about events from facts about
meaning, but insists the implications remain “radical and implausible.”266
As a matter of objective fact, he argues, there can be no doubt that the
Constitution’s assignment of “two” senators to each state “meant two and
not three or lasagna.”267 If there were no objective facts about the
meaning of numbers, Solum reasons, there would not be any objective
linguistic facts, either.268 But this would be wrong, he concludes, because
the existence of linguistic facts is empirically demonstrable.269
Again, Solum chose an easy target. As Mootz, Gadamer, and others
point out, numbers are a special case, able to retain unambiguous
meaning even over long periods of time.270 It does not follow that
linguistic symbols do so as well. No reasonable person disputes, for
example, the date of Kristallnacht or of the opening of the concentration
camp at Auschwitz. But what does it mean that for more than a decade
Nazis and their allies persecuted, tortured, and attempted to kill every Jew
they could find, succeeding in murdering six million (along with nearly
264. Id. (quoting Mootz, Originalism & Fixation, supra note 29, at 165).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 150.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. See Mootz, Originalism & Fixation, supra note 29, at 180; see also GADAMER, TRUTH
& METHOD, supra note 20, at 433 (“Only through mathematical symbolism would it be possible
to rise entirely above the contingency of the historical languages and the vagueness of their
concepts.”); Ian Bartrum, Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 157, 174 (2015)
(“[W]hen reading the Presidential Age Requirement we are all textualists, not originalists. . . . [I]n
the case of the Presidential Age Requirement, the ‘original’ and the ‘modern’ public meanings are
virtually identical.”).
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as many non-Jews)? That humans are naturally depraved, or only
Germans, or only Nazis? Was institutional Christianity responsible, with
its theology of the blood libel and passivity in the face of these atrocities?
Is the Holocaust an unanswerable theodicy that drives people to unbelief?
Did it create contemporary Israel? Is it related to a resurgence of antiSemitism in the West? These questions barely scratch the surface.
Events are facts in the world. But they do not naturally possess
objective, self-declaring meaning, or any meaning at all. The events and
facts known as “the Holocaust,” for example, are linked by a name that
sought to give them meaning literally years after they occurred.271 The
meaning of events in the past does not exist until we in the present try to
ascertain it.
C. Brown v. Board of Education
Conforming to the contemporary imperative that one’s interpretive
theory account for Brown v. Board of Education,272 Professor Solum has
offered two new-originalist defenses of Brown, one based on a revisionist
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by Michael McConnell
relying on post-ratification evidence of congressional understanding,273
271. See Holocaust, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
87793?rskey=a0zSBv&result=1#eid [https://perma.cc/22PD-9WSL] (noting in definition 2.d.
that use of “the Holocaust,” with definite article and capital “H” was introduced in English by
historians and other academicians in the late 1950s and early 1960s). The enormity of the
Holocaust seems to place it beyond any meaning.
272. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Professor Marshall suggests that Brown is actually only one item
on a long list of widely held contemporary constitutional values that originalist method cannot
justify, including gender equality; the guarantee of one person, one vote; privacy protection of
decisions whether or how to conceive, bear, raise, and educate children; Miranda warnings; and
application of equal protection norms to the federal government. See Confirmation Hearing on
the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 478–79 (2017)
(statement of William Marshall, William Rand Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
273. See McConnell, Originalism & Desegregation, supra note 27, at 1140; Michael
McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
457, 459, 461, 464 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Originalist Case]; see also AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 143–46
(2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION] (reading the original purposes and effects
of the Preamble, the Guarantee Clause, the Titles of Nobility Clauses, and the Bill of Attainder
Clauses with the Reconstruction Amendments to show that Brown and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), “vindicated the central meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments”); AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: A GRAND TOUR OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 116
(2015) (reading the same Clauses as showing that Jim Crow laws unconstitutionally created a
“subordinated caste” and “two classes of unequal citizenship . . . deprive[d African-Americans]
of genuinely equal laws” and prevented “different races” from “com[ing] together as equals” in
violation of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); Calabresi & Perl, supra
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and the other drawn from a purported distinction between original public
meaning and what we might call “original factual errors.”274 Oddly, and
yet predictably, both defenses depart from public-meaning methodology.
1. Elite Post-Ratification Evidence
Professor McConnell maintains that a series of congressional debates
and votes on the Civil Rights Act of 1875 two to six years after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that Brown was
either “correctly decided on originalist grounds” or “within the legitimate
range of interpretations commonly held” in 1868.275 Legal historians
praised McConnell’s work for the new light it shed on public school
segregation during Reconstruction, but forcefully rejected his claim that
this evidence demonstrated that one widely held understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 precluded racially segregated public
schools.276
Professor Solum endorses McConnell’s account despite its departure
from both halves of the new-originalist method to which he is committed.
McConnell provides scant evidence of the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment—that is, whether a member of the public in
1868, actual or hypothetical, would have understood the semantic
meaning of “privileges or immunities of citizenship” or “equal protection
of the laws” to prohibit racial segregation of public schools.277 Nor does
McConnell produce contextual evidence that might have clarified the
semantic meaning of these clauses to include such a prohibition.278 And
finally, the evidence McConnell does produce is not from the period of
drafting, ratification, and adoption, 1866 to 1868, but a post-ratification

note 27, at 435 (arguing that, because most state laws in 1868 presupposed access to public
education to be “a privilege or immunity of state citizenship,” the Fourteenth Amendment’s bar
on state abridgement of “privilege[s] or immunit[ies] of state citizenship” prohibited racially
segregated public education).
274. Solum, Surprising Originalism, supra note 50, at 259–67; Lawrence B. Solum,
Hearings on the Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the U.S., 31 DPCE ONLINE 575, 577 & n.5 (2017). This latter source is a
footnoted and slightly expanded version of Statement of Lawrence Solum.
275. McConnell, Originalist Case, supra note 273, at 458 (discussing the many and lengthy
debates over what was eventually enacted as Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335).
276. E.g., Klarman, supra note 24; Maltz, supra note 24; McConnell replied to Klarman in
Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman,
81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Reply to Klarman], and to Maltz in Michael
W. McConnell, Segregation and the Original Understanding: A Reply to Professor Maltz, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 233 (1996).
277. Cf. supra Part I.A.
278. Cf. supra Part I.B.
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period, 1870 to 1875, and comes not from the public, but a subset of elite
Americans—certain members of Congress.279
McConnell draws from understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment
publicly expressed by certain members of the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd
Congresses between 1870 and 1874 in their unsuccessful attempt to
include a prohibition of racially segregated public schools in the Civil
Rights Act of 1875;280 he especially concentrates on the handful of these
Senators who were also part of the 39th Congress, which drafted the
Amendment and reported it to the states for ratification in 1868.281
McConnell’s critics agree that during congressional debates on the
Civil Rights Act, some Republican members expressed their belief that
the Privileges or Immunities or Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment banned school segregation, and thus the
enforcement power of Section 5 empowered Congress to ban it by
statute.282 But other Republicans, and virtually all Democrats, rejected
this understanding, and it never became law.283 In short, rather than
relying on the original semantic meaning of the Amendment in its
historical context at adoption in 1868, as prescribed by public-meaning
methodology, McConnell relies on contested understandings of the
Amendment expressed during the early 1870s by a small group of elite
federal officeholders in their failed attempt to prohibit segregated schools
by statute.284 None of this is persuasive evidence that the public meaning
279. In this regard, Amar’s account of Brown is more consistent with public-meaning
method, because it relies on the public understanding of the relevant texts in the textual and
historical contexts existing at adoption. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
280. See McConnell, Originalism & Desegregation, supra note 27, at 1092–1100.
281. See id. at 1099 (showing that between nine and twelve senators who voted for the
Fourteenth Amendment later cast votes against school segregation during debates over the Civil
Rights Act).
282. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 24, at 1884; Maltz, supra note 24, at 224.
283. See Klarman, supra note 24, at 1914.
284. McConnell concedes that racially integrated public schools were deeply unpopular in
both the North and the South in the late 1860s, despite occasional incidents of integration.
McConnell, Reply to Klarman, supra note 276, at 1938–39. He contends that political support for
integrated schools grew in the early 1870s, after which it quickly dissipated with the waning of
political and popular support for Reconstruction in the mid- and late-1870s. Id. at 969–70.
McConnell further contends that congressional debates about school desegregation in
connection with the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were rich and robust, making them far better
evidence of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment than what he calls the weak and scattered
evidence available during the actual ratification debates in 1868. See McConnell, Originalism &
Desgregation, supra note 27, at 459; McConnell, Reply to Klarman, supra note 276, at 1944;
McConnell, Originalist Case, supra note 273, at 459.
Nevertheless, post-ratification debates and votes are not evidence of the public meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of ratification unless there is reason to believe that postratification understandings coincided with understandings at ratification. McConnell gives no
such reasons, and his critics provide reasons to believe that by the early 1870s public
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of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 prohibited racially segregated
public schools.
Whether McConnell’s argument succeeds on its own terms is not my
concern. My point is that he does not rely on public-meaning
methodology as defined by public-meaning originalists like Solum. The
puzzle is why Solum endorses it.
2. Mistaken Beliefs
As discussed above,285 Judge Bork shoe-horned Brown into publicmeaning originalism by suggesting that the American public in 1868
erroneously thought racially segregated schools cohered with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s principle of equality. This enabled Bork to
conclude that Brown abandoned a factual misunderstanding about the
meaning and effect of segregation, not the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.286
Professor Solum makes a similar argument. “Originalists believe that
the original meaning of the constitutional text is fixed and that it binds
us, but they do not believe that the framers’ beliefs about facts are
binding.”287 He identifies Bradwell v. Illinois,288 a Reconstruction-era
decision that upheld a state’s refusal to admit a highly qualified woman
to the bar, as a case in which the Court was led astray by “factual”
misunderstandings from the past.289 Solum observes that in 1868 the
“privileges” or “immunities” of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment included the right of any citizen to pursue a lawful
occupation,290 and “[w]hat . . . could be more ‘lawful’ than the practice
of law?”291 The original semantic meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, he concludes, included the right of any U.S. citizen,
male or female, to be admitted to the bar.

understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment had diverged sharply from those in evidence at its
ratification in 1868. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 24, at 1884, 1900 (arguing that Republican
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment radicalized in proportion to their loss of political
power in the aftermath of ratification).
285. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
286. BORK, supra note 1, at 82 (“[W]hen Brown came up for decision, it had been apparent
for some time that segregation rarely if ever produced equality.”).
287. Solum, Surprising Originalism, supra note 50, at 254; see also id. at 261 (“Originalism
is committed to the constitutional text—not the factual beliefs of those who wrote the text.”).
288. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
289. Id. at 139.
290. Solum, Surprising Originalism, supra note 50, at 252–53 (quoting M. Frances Rooney,
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and an Originalist Defense of
Gender Nondiscrimination, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. Pol’y 737, 32–33 (2017)).
290. Solum, Surprising Originalism, supra note 50, at 253.
291. Id.
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Then why didn’t Bradwell win? According to Solum, the Court and
the public in 1873 mistakenly believed that “women lacked the
intellectual capacity” to practice law.292 But we are bound only to the
original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not to the
original public’s misunderstandings about the world in which the Clause
would function. In Solum’s view, Bradwell was wrongly decided because
of its mistaken factual predicate about female capabilities, while the
Court’s gender-equality decisions more than a century later are actually
faithful to the original public meaning, having merely abandoned the
original mistake of fact about female capability.293
A comparable public-meaning defense of Brown easily follows.294
The original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
prohibited racial segregation of public schools under either the Privileges
or Immunities or Equal Protection Clause,295 but the Court and the
general public of the time erroneously believed some combination of
factual errors like “African American children are incapable of benefiting
from public education” (or “incapable of benefiting from the education
afforded to white children”), “separate-but-equal public schools do not
send a social message of African American inferiority,” or “white
supremacy is part of the natural order.”296 In this view, Brown merely
corrected original mistakes of fact about the capabilities of racial
minorities, the social meaning of segregation, and the supposedly
“natural” inevitability of white supremacy, but had no effect on the
original public meaning of the Amendment itself. Its guarantee of
African-American access to white public schools, as either a privilege or
immunity of citizenship or a mandate of the equal protection of the laws,
had never changed.
Solum sums up:
[O]riginalism is not committed to the patently ridiculous
proposition that facts about the world are fixed or the even
292. Id. at 254.
293. Solum’s argument ignores that the exclusion of women from the bar was based as much
on a range of complex value judgments about marriage and family as on what he calls “factual”
assumptions about female capability. For example, excluding women from professional and other
well-paying jobs outside the home was thought to promote marital unity by keeping wives
economically dependent on their husbands. Cf. Erin Blakemore, Why Many Married Women Were
Banned from Working During the Great Depression, HIST. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.history.
com/news/great-depression-married-women-employment [https://perma.cc/B3QT-MNAV]
(noting that a state banned married women from working when their spouses were employed).
294. Though Solum does not offer it, instead simply recurring to McConnell without
explanation. See Solum, Surprising Originalism, supra note 50, at 261–63.
295. Either access to integrated public schools is a “privilege . . . of citizens[hip],” or refusing
such access violates an “immunit[y] of citizens[hip]” against racial exclusion or denies the “equal
protection of the laws.” See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
296. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–52 (1896) (making comparable assertions).
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more ludicrous position that the application of public
meaning to current facts should be guided by the factual
beliefs of the public at the time constitutional provisions
were framed and ratified—much less the absolutely insane
idea that the false beliefs of the framers about facts bind us
today.297
Like Professor McConnell’s account of original meaning based on
post-ratification evidence, however, Solum’s distinction of original
mistakes of fact from original public meaning departs from publicmeaning methodology. Public-meaning originalism relies on context to
specify the ubiquitous vagaries and ambiguities in the original semantic
meaning of constitutional clauses; beliefs of the original public about
facts in the world would seem self-evidently part of this context, even
when mistaken. Take, yet again, the Domestic Violence Clause. As
related above, the framers feared popular uprisings against state authority
and included the Clause to obligate the federal government to assist
quelling such rebellions on state request.298 Southern slave-holding states
were especially supportive: they feared slave insurrections that might
exceed their law-enforcement resources.299 Suppose this fear had been
mistaken, and no slave rebellions had ever exceeded state enforcement
resources so that no state ever requested federal assistance to put down a
slave rebellion. Using Solum’s “original mistake of fact” analysis, the
belief of southern slave-holding states in 1787 that they had a special need
for the Domestic Violence Clause could not inform the historical context
surrounding the original semantic meaning of the Clause, because this
belief was factually wrong.
297. Solum, Surprising Originalism, supra note 50, at 261.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 39–44, 49–50, 52–54.
299. See, e.g., Debate in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3 DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 365, 427 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (remarks of George Nicholas) (noting that the Domestic Violence Clause
provides “additional security” to slave states by authorizing use of federal power “to quell an
insurrection of slaves” upon state application); View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. Note D at 140, 367 (St. George Tucker ed., Augustus M.
Kelley Publishers 1969) (1803) (“[The Domestic Violence Clause] secures . . . additional force to
the aid of any of the state governments, in case of an internal rebellion or insurrection against it’s
[sic] authority. . . . The southern states [are] more peculiarly open to danger from this quarter . . . .”
(third alteration in original)); see also Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to
Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 791 (1995)
(noting that the Domestic Violence Clause was a pro-slavery provision “applicable to slave
revolts.”); Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the
Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 429 & n.23 (1999) (noting that abolitionist
Wendell Phillips considered the Domestic Violence Clause one of “five key proslavery provisions
of the Constitution”).
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This “original mistake of fact” analysis fails on its own terms. It
confuses two kinds of facts—those about belief and those about its
content. The truth or falsity of a belief has no bearing on the truth or
falsity of the act of believing—a person can, in fact, believe something
that is, in fact, mistaken.300 Thus, it is factually correct that the southern
states feared their inability to deal with slave rebellions, even if this
inability might have proven factually mistaken. The first fact—
inhabitants of the southern states actually thought this way—is not
mistaken, and thus properly informs the original semantic meaning of the
Clause as a true fact about historical context,301 even though the content
of this thought—the feared deficiency of state enforcement resources in
case of slave rebellions—might have been wrong.
Likewise with Brown. The original semantic meanings of the
“privileges or immunities of citizenship” and the “equal protection of the
300. In “intensional” statements of the form, “I believe that x,” the truth of the main (subject)
clause, “I believe”, does not necessarily depend on the truth of the subordinate (object) clause,
“that x”—i.e., the main clause can be true even if the subordinate clause is false. See Gottlob
Frege, Sense and Reference, 57 PHIL. REV. 209, 218–20 (1948); see also Richard M. Gale,
Propositions, Judgments, Sentences, and Statements, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 234, at 494, 499 (“The main attraction of this analysis is that it answers the thorny
question of how a sentence can be both meaningful and false.”).
Professor Green has proposed a provocative originalist theory that argues we are bound by
the original fixed “intension” or “sense” of the constitutional text, but not by its variable
“extensions” or references in the world. See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the SenseReference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS L.J. 555, 564 (2006). Green’s theory preserves fixed
constitutional meaning without committing to fixed constitutional outcomes, just as the distinction
of application from interpretation purports to free public-meaning originalists from an original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that accommodated segregated public schools. See
id. at 593–627 (using the sense–reference distinction to conclude that by 1954, desegregation, one
of many possible original referents of the Fourteenth Amendment, was consistent with the
Amendment’s original anti-discrimination sense).
However, just as Gadamer holds that interpretation of a text is not distinct from its
application, other philosophers—notably Wittgenstein—dispute that sense can be isolated from
its references. See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 40 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958) (“[A] word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.”); id. ¶ 43
(“For a large class of cases . . . the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”); id. ¶ 139
(arguing that the meaning of words is determined by one’s understanding of their use); David
Weberman, A New Defense of Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 60 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
45, 58 (2000) (rejecting Hirsch’s analogous distinction between the meaning of a text and its
significance); see also John M. Connolly, Gadamer and the Author’s Authority: a LanguageGame Approach, 44 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 271, 272 (1986) (suggesting Wittgenstein
shared Gadamer’s view that meaning includes application). A full consideration of the sense–
reference distinction and its possible originalist uses is beyond the scope of this Article.
301. Cf. NOURSE, supra note 32, at 40 (“[O]rdinary meaning is prototypical meaning, which
is to say that it is meaning which picks the best example, rather than all logical extensions, of the
term. The best example is typically the best undisputed application of the law based on bipartisan
legislative evidence.” (footnote omitted)).
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laws” need contextual supplementation to specify their respective
original public meanings. Segregation was based on erroneous beliefs
about African-American capacities, the social meaning of segregation,
the supposed naturalness of white supremacy, and much else. But these
erroneous beliefs do not cancel or erase the separate fact that they were
widely held by the American public and federal office-holders in 1868
(and, for that matter, from 1870 to 1875 when the Civil Rights Act of
1875 was debated),302 as even Professor McConnell acknowledges.303 In
public-meaning method, such widely held beliefs are relevant contextual
evidence, “facts about context,”304 which properly supplement the
original semantic meaning of the Privileges or Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses. Such beliefs cannot be ruled out as “original mistakes
of fact” because the fact that they were widely held is not mistaken.
How can one “immerse” oneself in the 1868 world of Fourteenth
Amendment ratification, as public-meaning methodology requires,305
without taking note of the fact of then-widespread discriminatory racial
attitudes about integrated public schooling, repugnant as they are
today?306 These attitudes provide the very facts about historical context
that enable specification of the Fourteenth Amendment’s otherwise
imprecise semantic meaning;307 they are a proper part of public-meaning
analysis, however inconvenient they might be for an originalist defense
of Brown.
It is neither “patently ridiculous,” “ludicrous,” nor “insane”
(“absolutely” or otherwise) to include facts about contemporaneous
relevant beliefs within the original context of constitutional meaning.308
To the contrary, how can one not? Otherwise, we are asked to accept that
the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionally guaranteed women a right to practice law, and AfricanAmerican children a right to attend public schools with white children,
despite the fact that hardly any member of the public thought it meant
either of these things and numerous public officials publicly denied them.
If this is public-meaning originalism, it is badly named.

302. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 24, at 1884 (“It is inconceivable that most—indeed even
very many—Americans in 1866–68 would have endorsed a constitutional amendment to forbid
public school segregation.”).
303. See supra note 284.
304. See supra text accompanying note 31.
305. See supra note 13.
306. Cf. Klarman, supra note 24, at 1895 (“One senses that McConnell is playing upon our
modern abhorrence of racism and our tendency to regard racial prejudice as ‘irrational’ and racial
differences as socially rather than biologically constructed.”).
307. See supra Part I.B.
308. Cf. Solum, Surprising Orignialism, supra note 50, at 261.
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3. Present Influence
Philosophical hermeneutics holds that textual meaning is constituted
by the present as well as the past. This manifests itself in three ways:
textual interpretation always entails the interpreter’s self-interpretation,
the interpreter’s fusion of her (present) horizon with the (past) horizon of
the text expands both horizons, and the separation of application from
interpretation is an implausible account of textual meaning. Each of these
propositions is evident in Professor Solum’s effort to square Brown with
public-meaning originalism.
Why did Professor Solum embrace reconciliations of Brown with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s original public meaning that so obviously
depart from public-meaning methodology? We already know this answer.
McConnell embarked on his defense of Brown, and Solum endorsed it,
long after accounting for Brown became an interpretive imperative and
also after the rise of originalism and its critics in the 1980s. This likewise
explains the ipse dixit excluding “original public errors” from the
historical context of original semantic meaning.
The canonization of Brown is evidently at work in the strenuous
efforts of Bork, McConnell, Solum, and other public-meaning originalists
to square their theory with Brown and thereby blunt the moral
opprobrium that attaches to any theory that might justify the racist regime
Brown overthrew. In short, the past of the Fourteenth Amendment—its
original public meaning—is necessarily bound up with a present
imperative—that any viable theory of constitutional interpretation
account for the result in Brown.
The attempts of public-meaning originalists to find a public-meaning
justification of Brown also illustrate the error of conceptualizing
interpretive horizons in epistemological terms. The Fourteenth
Amendment arrived in 1954 encased in a constitutional tradition that
permitted “separate-but-equal” public education. Had the Warren Court
been epistemologically imprisoned in its own interpretive horizon, it
would not have been able to see past the conventional wisdom of
segregation to any different understanding. The Court’s horizon was not
epistemologically bound, however, but phenomenologically open: it
knew, from its own recent experiences and those of other federal
departments, that other possible understandings of the Amendment
existed, created by the dramatically enhanced importance of public
education in 1954 (compared to 1868) and erosion of nineteenth-century
beliefs about African-American capacities, the social meaning of
segregation, and the supposed supremacy of whites. As the Court said,
“[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 . . . .”309 Rather, it fused its
present with the past of the constitutional text, creating a new
309. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/2

56

Gedicks: The "Fixation Thesis" and Other Falsehoods

2020]

THE “FIXATION THESIS” AND OTHER FALSEHOODS

275

understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, which nevertheless
honored the claims of the text: “[I]n the field of public education . . .
‘separate-but-equal’ has no place. Separate education facilities are
inherently unequal.”310
Finally, public-meaning defenses of Brown show the poverty of
conceptually dividing application from interpretation. Racially
segregated and racially integrated public schools are equally consistent
with an abstract guarantee of the “privileges or immunities of citizenship”
and the “equal protection of the laws.”311 In the abstract, segregated
public schools that are equally funded might conceivably provide equal
opportunities and need have no pejorative social meaning about the status
of African-Americans. But in the real world, where segregation blocks
African-American opportunity and sends a message of inferiority
irrespective of equal funding, these norms are violated. It does no good
to adjudicate the contradiction of racial separation and racial equality
within the abstract original public meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment; this would simply raise the particulars of the cases to the
status of universals. It was not the abstract definition of equality that
dictated Brown any more than it dictated Plessy v. Ferguson; rather, the
particular result in both cases defined and created the meanings of
Fourteenth Amendment “equality.” Or, as Gadamer would have
concluded, application of the law in each instance concretized the law’s
meaning; the meaning of any law, abstracted from its applications, is
merely provisional. Each instance of applying the law is always its
(re)interpretation and (re)creation.
CONCLUSION: ONTOLOGY BEATS THIS THEORY
The task of constitutional interpretation is to connect the Constitution
and the traditions in which it is embedded with the world in which we
live, to “fuse the horizons” of constitutional past with constitutional
present. We cannot abandon the present for the past, as public-meaning
originalism presupposes, because the present is already baked into the
past. Nor can we cut loose the past from the present like those ubiquitous
bogeys, the “living constitutionalists,” because the past is also baked into
the present. This problem is neither normative (“How should we
determine constitutional meaning?”) nor epistemological (“How can we
determine constitutional meaning?”), but ontological (“What is
constitutional meaning?”). Constitutional meaning necessarily combines,
and cannot do other than combine, the effect of the past on our present
concerns and the effect of those present concerns on our understanding
of the very past that has shaped us in the present.
310. Id. at 495.
311. See Klarman, supra note 24, at 1931.
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The rhetorical power of originalism is its claim that only originalists
are virtuously applying objective method (“discovering constitutional
meaning”), while nonoriginalists are tainted by dishonest subjectivity
(“making it up”). But this dichotomy is false because the ontology on
which it rests is false: original public meaning doesn’t exist. This leaves
no room for the commonly voiced intermediate position that publicmeaning originalism (or some other version) is, despite its flaws and
limitations, “the best we can do” at ascertaining constitutional
meaning.312 This position misses the ontological point: if original public
meaning does not exist, then there is, quite literally, nothing to support
the conclusion that public-meaning originalism yields results more
faithful to the Constitution than non-originalist theories or, indeed, than
flipping coins or throwing dice.313
Meaning is not a fact fixed in the past unaffected by the present. Fixed
constitutional meaning and the other purported objectivities in which new
originalists wrap their theory are no less touched by interpretive
subjectivity in the present than the interpretive approaches new
originalists attack. Like all human inquiries into proper action in
particular situations, constitutional meaning is not determined by a priori
rule or objective method, but co-determined by the text and its traditions
from the past, together with the constitutional, political, social, and other
contemporary imperatives that always and already shape the judge and
her case.
The failure of public-meaning originalists to defend the ontology of
fixation leaves unanswered the hermeneutic claim that original public
meaning simply is not “there” in the past to be found. It takes an ontology
to beat an ontology, and new originalists haven’t got one.

312. See, e.g., McConnell, Reply to Klarman, supra note 276, at 1944. Several commentators
on earlier drafts also suggested this position.
313. Originalist taunts notwithstanding, see supra text accompanying note 19, there exist
plausible nonoriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 143–52 (2005); Richard H. Fallon, A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189
(1987). See generally PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982) (surveying nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional interpretation).
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